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DUELING WITH BOAT OARS, DRAGGING
THROUGH MOORING LINES:
TIME FOR MORE FORMAL RESOLUTION OF USE
CONFLICTS IN STATES' COASTAL WATERS?
BarbaraA. Vestal*
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Escalating use conflicts, the inertia of federal agencies, and a growing
appreciation of the value of states' public trust resources support the
assertion that state governments should take the lead in adopting comprehensive conflict resolution strategies for their coastal waters. The first
section of this Article reviews growing marine use conflicts and analyzes
why states should concern themselves with conflict resolution efforts in the
marine realm. Section II briefly discusses the complex interplay of state
and federal law in regulating marine uses. Section III, using the State of
Maine as a case study, explores its existing legal framework for management of submerged lands and waters above those lands. It looks at the
degree to which Maine's public trust doctrine contributes to resolution of
use conflicts, analyzes municipal authority for management of harbors and
submerged lands, and reviews state agency regulatory authority, focusing
on the submerged lands lease program. This case study is followed by an
analysis of conflict resolution mechanisms used in other states that may
have particular applicability to improving the management of Maine's
coastal waters. The conclusion offers recommendations for improving the
formal framework for conflict resolution in marine waters.

Shareholder, Chester and Vestal, P.A., Portland, Maine; formerly Associate Director,
Marine Law Institute, University of Maine School of Law. This Article was adapted from
a 1995 research report sponsored by grant number R/CE-217 from the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)/Sea Grant College Program through the University
ofMaine/University ofNew Hampshire Sea Grant College Program. References are current
only to that date, unless otherwise noted. The views expressed in this article are the author's
and do not necessarily reflect those of NOAA.
*
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A. Growing Marine Use Conflicts Mandate Increased
State Involvement
Marine waters and resources make critical contributions to the economic, social, and ecological well-being of coastal states. In the past, such
water resources were generally available to private users on a first-come
basis, without state or local regulation. However, over the last few
decades, the use of marine waters has increased, resulting in growing use
conflicts. Concurrently, increasing use has spawned a plethora of
single-focus regulatory agencies and narrow purpose laws which are
generally not designed to resolve conflicts among many uses.
Use conflicts involve issues of space allocation, resource allocation,
and allowable resource degradation.' Newspaper reports increasingly
reflect the pervasive nature of these conflicts. 2

1. Examples include: the opposition by commercial fishermen to oil and gas
exploration; conflicts between different vessel types; public concern over the risks of tanker
spills; conflicts between different types of fishing gear; conflicts between shellfish harvesters
and recreational boaters over water quality, dredging, and marinas; conflicts between
aquaculturists and capture fisheries; and competition for harbor space by all marine users.
Municipalities and others seeking to use marine waters for waste disposal find themselves
in increasing conflict with shellfish harvesters, recreational users, the tourism industry,
environmental groups and others who oppose degradation of the water quality.
2. Bruce Kyle, Matinicus CombatantsSwap Olive Branches,BANGOR DAILY NEWS,
Apr. 28, 1995, availablein 1995 WL 5825148 (beach skirmish involving men dueling with
boat oars said to be the result of cargo ships damaging lobster traps); Laurie Schreiber,
Maine ConsidersAllowing Draggersto Move Closerto Pens? ATLANTIC FISH FARMING,
May 27, 1995, at I (reports problems off Eastport, Maine where it was alleged that draggers
antagonistic to fish pen aquaculture had dragged through the area, tearing up pen mooring
lines); Clayton Beal, Green PartyPlans Public Clam Forum, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Mar.
21, 1995, available in 1995 WL 5820207 (reporting on continuing disputes between
clammers and wormers over whether flats closed to the harvest of clams for conservation
purposes should also be closed to the taking of marine worms); Clayton Beal, Sandworm
Diggers Remain on Strike, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, May 30, 1995, availablein 1995 WL
8761403 (worm diggers complaining about mussel draggers destroying the sandworm and
bloodworm habitat); Emmet Meara, Maine FishermenJoin Efforts to Resolve Industry's
Problems,BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Mar. 4, 1995, availablein 1995 WL 5819088 (lobstermen
alleging that groundfish draggers disturb lobster habitat and destroy lobster traps);
Brunswick Cleans up Coast for Clams, Banned Discharge Systems Removed, BANGOR
DAILY NEWS, Aug. 26, 1993, availablein 1993 WL 6327622 (clammers and local officials
complaining that shorefront homeowners with "overboard discharge" waste disposal systems
keep otherwise productive clam flats closed to digging); State Officials ReconsiderPlan to
Close Clam Flats, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Mar. 25, 1995, available in 1995 WL 5822779
(state officials evaluating closing of productive clam flats because of potential pollution from
illegally discharged waste water from the increasing number of pleasure boats).
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It is in the states' best interest to increase their involvement in resolving marine use conflicts. The existing federal and state laws, as modified
from time to time by single-interest amendments proposed by discrete user
groups, are unequal to the task of appropriately resolving these multiple use
conflicts. The states' fiduciary, economic development, and sovereign
interests are not well-served by a laissez faire approach. To maximize the
utility of this common property resource, a state must: 1) develop a
comprehensive statement of goals and priorities for marine waters to
establish the context within which allocation decisions will be made about
conflicting demands on public resources; 2) review existing allocation
mechanisms, and as appropriate, develop new mechanisms to implement
the allocation decisions; and 3) develop sectoral management strategies
which are consistent with those goals and priorities.
1.

Coastal Waters Are a PublicResource of the State

The submerged lands adjacent to each state, out to the three-mile limit,3
are owned by each state.4 This state ownership applies to the sea bed, the
water column, and the plant and animal life living within these waters. The
state has certain fiduciary responsibilities to hold these lands for the benefit
of the public.5
The state has at least three different, but not necessarily mutually
exclusive, interests to consider in the management of these lands: 1) its
fiduciary responsibility as trustee of publicly owned submerged lands; 2)
its governmental responsibility to enhance the long-term economic,
environmental and fiscal well-being of all of its citizens; and 3) its desire
as an independent sovereign to reduce the interference from other states or
the federal government.
2. Not All Demand Can Be Accommodated
Approximately fifteen years ago, a federal study seeking a new
perspective on ocean management observed:

3. Unless otherwise established as a greater distance as in Florida and Texas. See
United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1 (1960); United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950).
4. The Submerged Lands Act, ch. 345,67 Stat. 462 (1953) (codified as amended at
43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315 (1994)). The Submerged Lands Act quitclaimed to coastal states
all federal ownership rights in the three-mile territorial sea, subject to certain reserved federal
rights, and retained federal rights to the seabed and subsoil beyond three miles. Id.
5. See infra Part 1II.B.1.
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[M]uch of ocean space is already allocated: to fishing, navigation,
national security, recreation, atmospheric maintenance, and
sustenance of a vast web of interconnected life forms and geological processes. They are not a last frontier in the sense of unused
land, nor are they free of jurisdictional and policy constraint.
Greater pressure to use the oceans can already be seen, but its full
force is probably some years away. It is also probable that not all
of this demand can be accommodated, although national philosophy and political inclinations may be reluctant to respond to this
limitation.6
All indicators suggest that these space and resource allocation issues
have increased in intensity and complexity over the last fifteen years.7
There is an increasing concentration of human population within the coastal
region. Since the early 1980s, the annual growth rate of population in U.S.
coastal counties has been significantly higher than in coastal states or in the
nation as a whole.8 This trend is expected to continue, with an estimated
fifty-nine percent of the nation's 1980-2000 population growth expected to
occur in the coastal zone.9
In addition to an increased population adjacent to coastal waters,
tourism and recreational use of these waters is increasing.' Traditional
pastimes such as boating and recreational fishing, along with relatively new

6. JOHN M. ARMSTRONG & PETER C. RYNER, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, OCEAN
MANAGEMENT: SEEKING A NEW PERSPECTIVE 56 (1980).
7. For example, NOAA's Sea Grant College Program and NOAA's Coastal Ocean
Program have both identified conflicts among multiple users of ocean and near-shore space
as one of the most important issues currently facing the marine community. UNIV. OF
ME.IUNIV. OF N.H. SEA GRANT COLLEGE PROGRAM, LONG RANGE PLAN 14, 29-30 (1992)
(need to identify mechanisms to resolve conflicts among traditional commercial fisheries
employing different gear types, between commercial harvesters and aquaculturists, between
recreational and commercial harvesters, and a myriad of non-fisheries access and use conflict
issues posed by growth along the New England coastal corridor); NOAA COASTAL OCEAN
PROGRAM, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RESEARCH TEAM WORKSHOP FOR COASTAL PROGRAM,
MULTIPLEUSE CONFLICT WORK GROUP RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS (Silver Spring, MD,

Sept. 24-25, 1991).
8.

CTR. FOR URBAN AND REG'L STUDIES, UNIV. OF N.C. AT CHAPEL HILL, VALUING

COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT 16 (Charles S. Colgan ed., 1990). This trend was
projected to continue at least through 2000.
9. Id. at 5.
10. Edward D. Goldberg, Competitorsfor Coastal Ocean Space, OCEANUS, Spring
1993, at 13.

1999]

Dueling with Boat Oars, Dragging Through Mooring Lines

5

ocean-based leisure activities such as sea kayaking, personal thrill craft,
wind surfing, cruising sail boats, and whale watching, increase public use
of coastal waters." Domestic cruise ship travel has also increased in the
last decade, as an increasing proportion of travelers opt to avoid international instability. 2
Closely related to the increased popularity of marine waters is a trend
toward building shops, offices, residences, and other non-water dependent
uses on or near the shore. These non-marine uses, seeking to capitalize on
the marine ambiance, expect unobstructed vistas of undeveloped waters and
the absence of objectionable noise and odors, frequently in direct conflict
with the needs of competitive working ports and marine industries. 3
Finally, emerging marine industries, made possible by recent technological developments, bring with them new concepts of how marine
resources should be used. Aquaculture, emerging as a fast-growing
industry, relies on agricultural concepts of exclusive use of sea bed or water
column space and private ownership of the living resources located within
that space; this is in direct contrast to the non-exclusive, capture approach
of traditional fisheries. Similarly, endeavors viewing the oceans as a
potential source of renewable energy place new value on characteristics of
marine waters such as temperature differences between waters
of varying
14
depths, tidal power, wave energy, and ocean current energy.
Thus, as more people are concentrated in coastal regions and an
increasing number of enterprises place different values on a wide variety
of marine resources, it becomes increasingly clear that not all of the
demand can be accommodated. Hard choices have to be made to minimize
the costs of continued, unresolved conflicts.

11. See Phyllis Austin, Fishingfor a Future: Self-reliant Stonington Faces up to
Tourism with Some Trepidation, MAINE TIMES, July 29, 1994, § 1, at 2, available in
LEXIS/NEXIS, NEWS/ARCNWS file. Letitia Baldwin, Ways Sought to ProtectSea Bird
Habitat,BANGOR DAILY NEws, Nov. 2, 1995, availablein 1995 WL 10898059.
12. Jon Marcus, Cruising:NorthAmerican Sailinginto Fall,More CruisesAreLining
up to Capturethe Colors ofAutumn Blazing Close to Home, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1994, at
L8.
13. SeeMARINELAwINsT.,MANAGINGTHESHORELINEFORWATERDEPENDENTUsEs
(1988).
14. See Carolyn Elefant, Ocean Energy Development in the 1990s, 14 ENERGY L.J.
335 (1993).
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Difficulty of Managing Common PropertyResources

Resources which are publicly owned or owned in common are often
referred to as "common property resources" or "common pool resources."
Submerged lands and living marine resources are examples of this type of
resource. 15
A unique set of issues is raised by common property resources. Absent
a management regime, they are equally available to everyone but no one
can exclude others from making use of them. This situation can result in
waste of the resource in two ways: its degradation through uncontrolled
overuse, or loss of its value through underuse because of insufficient
incentives to invest in infrastructure or other improvements to facilitate
maximum use. Many theories, such as the tragedy of the commons, the
economics of public goods, and the prisoner's dilemma, have been advanced by theorists to explain complexities involved in use and allocation
16
of this type of resource.
However, individuals sharing a common resource are not necessarily
trapped in a tragedy. In theory, development of an appropriate form of
management can avoid waste due to under or overuse, and can more
rationally protect and allocate common property resources.
Broadly speaking, at least three different policy prescriptions for
management of common resources have been advanced: 1) self-regulation
by stakeholders or users through shared decision-making, often referred to
as co-operative management; 7 2) privatization of common resources
through the creation of private property rights; and 3) a centralized management solution which relies on strengthened governmental management to
allocate resources, such as through governmental agency determination of
permitted uses and users.' 8
For a common pool resource such as state marine waters, where there
is currently no comprehensive management plan, the future management
emphasis must be placed on strengthening governmental management first,

15. See Carol Rose, The Comedy ofthe Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently
PublicProperty, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 (1986).
16. See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 2-7 (1990) (descriptions of the tragedy of the commons, the
prisoner's dilemma game and the logic of collective action).
17. See Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls:Management Strategies
for Common Resources, 1991 DUKE L.J. 9 (1991).
18. An example of which would be through agency determination of permitted uses
and users. OSTROM, supra note 16, at 1.
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rather than relying on co-operative management or increased privatization
to provide appropriate management. A precondition for effective management of this common resource is the development of a public consensus,
through governmental leadership, on the broad goals, priorities and guiding
principles for allocation decisions. Neither co-operative management' 9 nor
privatization of the resource are equal to the task of conflict resolution and
resource allocation. Where there are ongoing disputes among a multiplicity
of user groups which value disparate resource functions and values, 0
neither co-operative management nor privatization are designed to optimize
the interests of the general public, except as those interests coincide with
the self-interest of commodity or resource users.2 While self-regulation by
19. In analyzing multiple local fisheries co-management efforts, observations about
the most favorable conditions for development and nmaintenance of co-management suggest

that a co-management strategy is most feasible only for a well defined user sub-group rather
than for the entire range of water users. Evelyn Pinkerton, Introduction:Attaining Better
FisheriesManagement through Co-Management, in CO-OPERATIvE MANAGEMENT OF
LOCAL FISHERIES: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR IMPROVED MANAGEMENT AND COMMUNrrY
DEVELOPMENT 27 (Evelyn Pinkerton ed., 1989). Pinkerton determined that the best
environment for co-management is a fairly small area such as a watershed or local waters,
"where the number of fishermen or communities is not too large for effective communication, or where there are well-organized sub-groupings ... which communicate well with
each other or have effective umbrella organizations," and where the government bureaucracy
is small in size and has a regional or local mandate. Id. at 27-28.
20. Theories ofoptimum management of common pool resources have generally been
developed in the context of a small-scale resource, such as a particular inshore fishery,
irrigation system, communal forest, or grazing area. See id. at 26-28; OSTROM, supra note
16, at 26 (a study of small-scale common property resources located in one country, affecting
50 to 15,000 individuals who are heavily dependent on the resource for economic returns).
While some of these theories anticipate the need to work with a broad range of groups to
foster protection of habitat, they generally emphasize a single resource. They might include
consideration of -activities which degrade the target resource by positing that individuals
engaged in that activity are receiving an "indirect allocation" of that resource. But even
though they acknowledge the role of competing user groups in affecting allocation of a key
resource these policy prescriptions are not designed to mediate disputes among a multiplicity
of resource functions and values, as would be required of a state-wide marine resource
management plan. R. Bruce Rettig et al., The Future of Fisheries Co-Management: A
Multi-DisciplinaryAssessment,in CO-OPERATIVEMANAGEMENTOFLOCALFISHERIES, supra
note 19, at 278.
21. For example, co-operative management research is generally focused on how to
"enable individuals to achieve productive outcomes in situations where temptations to
free-ride and shirk are ever present." OSTROM, supranote 16, at 15. A typical measure of
economic success is whether the individuals dependent on a particular shared resource for
their economic well-being can optimize their mutual good. Pinkerton, supra note 19, at 5.
While this is certainly a relevant consideration, whether it should be the primary measure of
success in a state-wide marine resource management plan is questionable at best. Many
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stakeholders or privatization may eventually play a role, the critical first
step in adopting and implementing a comprehensive management program
requires strengthened governmental leadership in coastal waters.
Actual establishment of the procedures and institutions to implement
a state-wide management plan will be a very complex process.2 It is likely
that as implementation efforts become more resource-specific, the
state-wide management plan will eventually combine aspects of all of these
approaches. The challenge will be to identify which combinations of
approaches are most promising for specific resources,' while at the same
time maintaining comprehensive state oversight so that the individual parts
combine into a rational overall strategy consistent with public values.
Co-management is most feasible if attempted on a relatively smallscale, with simple functions to be managed by well organized representative sub-groups which communicate well with each other.24 While these
conditions are absent on a state-wide scale, they may emerge within very
specific user sub-groups once the broader marine resource guidelines and
hierarchies are established through governmental processes. Co-operative
common property resource management appears to be most viable for: 1)
subcomponents within marine resource users, such as a localized group of
fishermen targeting one resource (e.g., lobstermen based on a particular
fairly remote island); 2) consumable resources such as fish stocks, rather
than more intangible values such as fish and wildlife habitat; and 3)
vulnerable resources such as mobile stocks ranging over vast territory,
where compliance with centralized regulations is difficult to monitor and
enforce, and where a management scheme developed and accepted by the

would argue that general public values, rather than the self-interest of commodity users,
should guide state policy. See Michael C. Blumm, Public Choice Theory and the Public
Lands: Why 'Multiple Use' Failed, 18 HARV. ENvTL. L. REv. 405 (1994).
22. OsTROM, supra note 16, at 14.
23. The selection of a management strategy for a particular resource will depend on
many factors including the amount of pressure on the resource, the degree of mobility of the
resource, the degree to which enforcement will be dependent upon the goodwill and consent
of the regulated, and whether private property rights are administratively feasible or
politically acceptable. R. Bruce Rettig et al., supra note 20, at 273. Relatively immobile
resources like a particular submerged lands site, clams, oysters, or fish that stay in a limited
area are theoretically amenable to management by the allocation of property rights. Mobile
stocks may be significantly less amenable to management through a property rights system;
if there are significant barriers to governmental policing and enforcement over large areas,
the need for particular user groups to cooperate in implementation of a management system
may make a co-management approach more appropriate for that particular resource.
24. See Pinkerton, supra note 19.
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user group may enhance compliance. Co-operative management is not
likely to make a unique contribution to management of non-transient uses,
such as aquaculture facilities or permanent structures on submerged lands.
For these permanent uses, policing and enforcement are not particularly
difficult, and compliance is not dependent upon the consent of the governed.
The other approach to management of a common resource is through
increased privatization. Throughout the history of American public land
law, various interests have continued to debate whether the public interest
will be best served by grants or other dispositions to private interests, or by
continued public ownership and management.' In theory, privatization
provides a common benefit by giving individuals incentives to improve
land for more productive use. The individual is granted permission to make
improvements on public lands and is, in turn, protected from having to
share that investment with other users without compensation.
No individual is likely to invest in a marine resource project unless that
individual has reasonably long term control over such a project and has the
right to exclude others. Governmental transfer of a property interest to the
individual, such as through a long-term submerged lands lease, can, in
theory, advance the public interest by fostering improvement of the leased
land which makes the remaining public submerged lands capable of more
productive use.
However, privatization has come under increasing criticism, particularly based on the past failures ofprivatization for federally-owned western
lands.26 While the policy of "multiple use" behind privatization of federal
lands seems neutral on its face, it is often criticized for being inherently
biased in favor of self-interested commodity users.27 Due to the dispropor

25. GEORGECAMERON COGGINS AND CHARLES F. WILKINSON, FEDERALPUBLICLAND
AND RESOURCES LAW 58-61 (2d ed. 1987).

26. Blumm, supra note 21, at 406.
Laws which grant private property rights in water and mineral resources with
little or no consideration of the public interest are a major cause of the enormous
amount of environmental destruction in the West. In view of the immense social
costs generated by the private rights systems that dominate Western water and
mining law, it is unclear why anyone would ever call for privatization of the
public lands.
Id.
27. Id. Blumm asserts that self-interested commodity users have the most incentive
and the most success in advancing their economic well-being. The general public interest
is inevitably sacrificed in the decision-making process due to the power of organized special
interests to take advantage of the standardless delegation of authority to administrative
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tionate ability of commodity users to influence agency decisions, the
resulting governmental land management practices tend to protect the most
remunerative resources, not the most vulnerable. This can be seen as
inconsistent with the national public interest-the protection of indigenous
fish and wildlife and ecologically vital watersheds.2 8
While this analysis is often based on western federal terrestrial lands,
the same type of dynamic may emerge in decision-making about stateowned aquatic lands. Certainly there is the same risk that interest groups
of well-organized users could skew the process so that it favors protection
of the most remunerative resources even if a legislative body has not made
a conscious judgment about whether these resources have the most utility
for the public.2 9
4. Existing Laws InadequatelyAddress Marine Conflict Resolution
While there are currently numerous federal and state laws that regulate
a multiplicity of activities in marine resources, they typically contribute
little to conflict resolution.3" Marine waters are typically regulated by
multiple local, state and federal agencies, each with a narrow mandate to

agencies.
28. Id. at 43 1. Blumm asserts that the facial neutrality of multiple use concepts should
be replaced with a positive mandate to administer public lands primarily for public purposes.
This new standard would:
[E]mphasize the development of sustainable ecosystems and the simultaneous
production of renewable resources that do not damage watersheds or fish and
wildlife species .... Congress should make clear that sustained yield means
sustained production of all resources over the long term, and that multiple use
means simultaneous resource management, not the landscape of segregated
dominant uses we see today.
Id. at 430.
29. One important legal difference between federal and state lands, however, is in the
applicability of the public trust doctrine. Whether a federal common law public trust
doctrine exists which is applicable to federal public lands is still a matter of considerable
debate. See JACKH. ARCHER ETAL., THEPUBLICTRUSTDOCTRINEANDTHEMANAGEMENT
OF AMERICA'S COASTS 154-61 (1994). However, it is settled that the public trust doctrine
does apply, with individual state variations, to state-owned submerged lands. Id. For those
lands, the doctrine generally holds that the government may not convey public lands into
private ownership if doing so would unduly interfere with the interest of the public in that
resource. Id. The existence of this state common law doctrine makes it more compelling to
use public utility as the yardstick for use and allocation decisions.
30. But see discussion infra Section IV regarding the emerging efforts of several
leading states.
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enforce one or more single purpose laws." This fragmented management
of marine resources is typical of other statesas well.
In the absence of formal governmental conflict resolution mechanisms
such as explicit goals setting and listing a hierarchy of uses for marine
waters, decisions are made on an ad hoc basis. These decisions can be
through narrow amendments, single purpose laws, or through tradeoffs and
compromises reached in disputes over particular development projects.32

31. For example, a recent study for Maine found that twenty-eight state agencies
spread across ten departments, three regional authorities, and nine federal agencies have a
significant role in determining what use is made of Maine's marine waters. No single agency
has been designated to develop a comprehensive state policy for the use of coastal waters,
to develop criteria to resolve conflicts among different uses, or to coordinate the different
agencies with marine responsibilities. JOHN CATENA ETAL., POLICY OPTIONS FOR MAINE'S
MARINE WATERS 47 (Maine Coastal Program 1992). See also, DONNA R. CHRISTIE,
GOVERNOR'S OFFICE OFPLANNING AND BUDGETING, FLORIDA'S OCEAN FUTURE: TOWARD

A STATE OCEAN POLICY 21-27 (1989); BILIANA CICIN-SAIN Er AL., NATIONAL COASTAL
RESOURCES RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE, IMPROVING OCEAN MANAGEMENT
CAPACITY IN THE PACIFIC COAST REGION: STATE AND REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES 13-15

(1991); and RICHARD MCLAUGHLIN & LAURAS. HoWORTH, MISSiSSIPPI-ALABAMA SEA
GRANT LEGAL PROGRAM, MISSISSIPPI OCEAN POLICY STUDY 13.1 (1991).
32. For example, in the 1995 session, more than a dozen bills related to very specific
marine use conflicts were introduced in Maine's Legislature; the Oolicy-makers had to
evaluate the proposed resource allocation adjustments without benefit of an overall plan for
managing marine resources. See An Act to Impose a Moratorium on New Lobster and Crab
Fishing Licenses and to Develop a Resource Management Plan for the Lobster Industry,
L.D. 626, 117th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 1995); An Act to Establish a Management
Framework for the LobsterFishery within State Waters, L.D. 782,117th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess.
(Me. 1995) (limited entry and limit on number of traps); An Act Concerning Licensed
Activities for Marine Worm Diggers, L.D. 570, 117th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 1995) (to
restrict worm harvest in clam flats closed for conservation); An Act to Authorize Game
Wardens to Enforce Prohibitions against Swimming in Navigable River Channels, L.D. 524,
117th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 1995) (giving ability to prohibit, through rulemaking,
swimming in areas deemed to be hazardous); An Act to Restrict the Use of Motorboats and
Personal Watercraft on Certain Bodies of Water, 117th Leg., L.D. 244, 1st Reg. Sess. (Me.
1995) (restricting motorboats and personal watercraft on certain inland waters); An Act to
Repeal the Law that Prohibits Dragging and Scalloping in the Frenchboro Area, L.D. 129,
117th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 1995); An Act to Impose Appropriate Fees and Restrictions
to Prevent the Out-of-State Transport of Sea Cucumbers, L.D. 1101, 117th Leg., 1st Reg.
Sess. (Me. 1995) (to protect the availability of sea cucumbers as a marine resource); An Act
to Protect Near-shore Groundfish Spawning Areas, L.D. 1210, 117th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess.
(Me. 1995) (prohibits all commercial harvesting of all marine organisms in cod, haddock or
yellowtail flounder spawning areas during the spawning period); An Act to Amend the Law
Regarding the Lease of Submerged Lands, L.D. 1404,117th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 1995)
(to repeal the submerged lands lease program and grantprivate and public entities facilitating
public trust uses exclusive rights to submerged lands upon registration); An Act to Allow
Municipalities to Grant Aquaculture Licenses for Sea Vegetables, L.D. 993, 117th Leg., 1st
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In the face of growing intensity and complexity of use conflicts, this ad hoc
approach is no longer sufficient to manage economically valuable,
publicly-owned resources.
The development of a comprehensive management plan will not be
easy. The 1980 federal study which projected greater ocean use conflicts
postulated that if more interests were to be accommodated, certain changes
would be required in the management programs in the future.33 This study
projected that, in the future, a structured ocean management or allocation
system will be required to, at a minimum, prevent growing numbers of
activities from interfering with each other or, at best, insure that new
activities would be consistent with broader public interests. 4 Even with a
more structured process, the study predicted decision- makers will still have
to resolve fundamental issues such as "basic conflicts of interest, the finite
nature of ocean space, [and] the sensitivities and limited carrying capacity
of the ocean., 35 Finally, decisions would have to progress beyond "narrow
or single purpose decisions" to "systems evaluation, seeking out impact
networks, [and] long range cumulative implications."36 While this particular study focused on federal ocean programs, its observations are applicable
to state territorial sea management programs as well.
Thus, given a finite resource, the current challenge facing coastal
policy makers is to restructure the marine resource management regime so
that it is based upon a comprehensive, integrated set of policy objectives
with clear processes to establish priorities among uses and criteria for
resolving use conflicts. This requires readjusting the management focus,
which has previously been set on the details of managing a particular sector
or resource, to a broader focus encompassing the full complement of
marine resources to assess options and make choices about how best to
protect and use them from an ecosystem approach. Due to the complexity
and entrenchment of many federal management institutions, readjusting the

Reg. Sess. (Me. 1995) (expands scope of municipal authority); An Act to Increase the
Maximum Lease Size for Bottom Culture Aquaculture, L.D. 1511, 117th Leg., IstReg. Sess.
(Me. 1995) (to increase the maximum lease area per person for bottom culture from 150 to
300 acres); An Act to Preserve Fishing Stocks, L.D. 1464, 117th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me.
1995) (to extend State marine resources laws out to 12-miles offshore); An Act to Change
the Restricted Area around Aquaculture Pens from 500 to 300 Feet, L.D. 719, 117th Leg.,
1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 1995) (to prohibit all harvesting of marine organisms within 300 feet of
aquaculture equipment and increase penalties).
33. ARMSTRONG & RYNER, supra note 6, at 57.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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focus to allow consideration of the "big picture" will require much more

than fine-tuning existing laws; it may require a new approach. Coastal
states and their subdivisions have significant roles to play in developing
such holistic marine management plans.
II. COMPLEX RNTERPLAY OF STATE AND FEDERAL LAWS

While asserting that states should exert more authority over submerged
lands, it is important to recognize the federal government may impose some
limits on state authority. Simply stated, but harder to detail, state and
federal governments have "concurrent jurisdiction" over submerged lands,
defined as those tidal lands extending out three geographic miles from the

coastline.37 Therefore, several entities may have jurisdiction over a
particular aspect or resource within that zone. The precise limits of the
authority of each agency are often controversial and complex, and, if
litigated, may present the court with very fact-dependent questions of first

impression.
Due to these unsettled issues, it may be more efficient for states to
attempt to proceed in coordination with federal agencies than investing a
lot of effort to determine precise jurisdictional limits." However, more
exact delineation of the precise boundaries of concurrent jurisdiction may
be unavoidable if the state and federal governments have opposing interests.
The following section contains a very brief overview of the federal
Submerged Lands Act, federal preemption, and related federal laws. It
concludes with an illustration of how these issues interplay in the context
of state and local efforts to regulate anchoring to address use conflicts.
A. SubmergedLands Act
The federal Submerged Lands Act of 19533' quitclaimed to the
individual states "all right, title, and interest" to lands beneath navigable
waters within state boundaries and to the natural resources within such
lands and waters. Those lands extend seaward to a line at least three
37. 43 U.S.C. § 1312 (1994).
38. See THE OR. OCEAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENTTASK FORCE, OREGON'S OCEAN

178-89 (1991) (suggesting that the state should "assert the
principle of jointly managing ocean resources and uses with the federal government" as a
RESOURCES MANAGOEMENTPLAN

means to ensure ecologically sound decisions).

39. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315 (1994).
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geographical miles from the coastline.' The natural resources covered by
the Act include oil, gas, other minerals, marine animal and plant life, but
specifically exclude water power or the use of water for the production of
power.4' The grant to the states does specifically include the "right and
power to manage, administer, lease, develop and use the said lands and
4
natural resources all in accordance with applicable State law., 1
However, the federal government retained control of these lands and
waters for purposes of navigation, flood control, or the production of
power.43 The United States also expressly retained:
[A]ll its navigational servitude and fights in and powers of regulation and control of said lands and navigable waters for the constitutional purposes of commerce, navigation, national defense, and
international affairs, all of which shall be paramount to... rights
of ownership ... or management ... assigned to the respective
States. 44
In addition, the Act confirmed the rights of the United States to the lands
and resources seaward of three miles.45
B. FederalPreemption and Related FederalLaws
By confirming state ownership but reserving other rights to the federal
government, the Submerged Lands Act sets up a management system that
will inevitably require a determination of whether the reserved federal
rights prevent the state from regulating particular resources. The judicial
doctrine of federal preemption will guide this determination.
Reviewing courts generally start with a presumption that state police
powers are not superseded by federal law "unless that was the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress., 46 The court may find that the state law is
preempted if: 1) Congress implicitly occupies the field through pervasive
regulation that leaves no room for the States to supplement it; or 2) there

40. Id. § 1312.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. § 1301(e).
Id. § 1311(a)(2).
Id. § 1311(d).
Id. § 1314(a).
Id. § 1332.
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1950).
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is an actual conflict between federal law and state regulation, preempting
the state regulation.47
The preemption argument can be advanced on the basis of the powers
such as regulation of commerce, navigation, and national defense which
were expressly retained by the federal government pursuant to the Submerged Lands Act,4' or on the basis of a conflict with federal laws or
regulations subsequently adopted in furtherance of those reserved
interests.49 Few of these laws are broadly applicable to management of the
coastal system. Most are applicable only to a single purpose, a single
resource or a single use.50 These laws generally focus on a particular

activity such as oil spills, navigational patterns, pollution, or protection of
marine mammals; however they exert control regardless of the location,
thus they indirectly influence the use of a states' marine waters.

47. Beveridge v. Lewis, 939 F.2d 859, 861 (9th Cir. 1991).
48. See Hawaiian Navigable Waters Preservation Soc'y v. Hawaii, 823 F. Supp. 766
(D. Haw. 1993) (state regulations on anchoring and mooring in state waters were not
preempted by the federal reservatibn of power over navigation in the Submerged Lands Act).
49. THERESOURCESAGENCYOFCAL, CAL1FORNIA'S OCEAN RESOURCES:AN AGENDA
FORTHE FUTURE app. E (draft 1995) (identifying forty-five federal statutes that pertain to the
regulation or management of coastal or ocean resources).
50. According to one coastal expert, before 1970, the only real management of coastal
and ocean waters was done by the states, but such management was very limited. The
exception was offshore oil and gas, where management was divided between the state and
federal governments by the passage of the Submerged Lands Act and the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act in 1953. During the 1970s, the federal government took a more active role,
passing about a dozen major federal laws on ocean resources and space, but these laws
generally regulated only a single purpose, use, or resource. CICIN-SAINetal., supranote 31,
at 1-2.
51. The federal laws with the most impact on state-owned marine waters include (the
following list adapted from OR. POLICY ADVISORY COUNCIL, STATE OF OREGON TERRITORIAL SEA PLAN 19-23 (1994)): Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act), 33
U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1387 (1986 & Supp. 1995); Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA), 16
U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1994); Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and
Liability Actof 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994); Endangered Species Act
of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994); Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and
Management Act (Magnuson-Stevens Act), 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801-1883 (1995 & Supp.
1997); Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1421h (1994); Marine
Plastics Pollution Research and Control Act of 1987, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1901-1912 (1986 &
Supp. 1995); Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1431-1445a
(1994); Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-712 (1994); National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321-4347 (1994); National Wildlife
Refuge System Administration Act of 1966, 16 U.S.C. §§ 668dd-668ee (1994); Ocean
Dumping Act, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1401-1445 (1986 & Supp. 1995); Oil Pollution Act (OPA)
of 1990,33 U.S.C.A. §§ 2701-2761 (1986 & Supp. 1995); Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899,
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In counterbalancing a federal preemption argument, courts also
consider the fact that the federal government has endorsed state and local
management of state waters out to three miles. The Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) of 1972 articulates as its major premise that "[t]he key
to more effective protection and use of the land and water resources of the
coastal zone is to encourage the states to exercise their full authority over
the lands and waters in the coastal zone. ' 12 The primary incentives for state
participation in the program were twofold: federal financial assistance for
plan development and implementation, and a prospect of influencing
federal actions through federal consistency requirements. 3 Congress, in
enacting the CZMA, expected states to plan and manage for the development of the states' coastal resources using existing state authority to
implement land use and water use programs for the coastal zone. 4
To be eligible for continuing financial support, a state coastal plan
must include "broad guidelines on priorities of uses in particular areas,
including specifically those uses of lowest priority" and a "definition of...
permissible land and water uses within the zone which have a direct and
significant impact on the coastal waters."55 In addition, the state or its
subdivisions must have authority to utilize land and water use regulations,
control development, and resolve conflicts among competing uses. 6
Congressional intent was not to limit state management to land or
land/water areas of interaction. Congress envisioned that states would
control the development of submerged lands and exert police power
authority over land and water uses in the entire coastal zone. 57 This vision

33 U.S.C.A. §§ 401-413 (1986 & Supp. 1995); and Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 43

U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315 (1988). Adapted from OR.

POLICY ADVISORY COUNCIL, STATE OF
OREGON TERRITORIAL SEA PLAN 19-23 (1994). See also THE RESOURCES AGENCY OF CAL.,

supra note 49, at app. E, for a more inclusive list of laws affecting coastal waters within and
beyond three miles.
52. 16 U.S.C. § 145 1(i).
53. The federal consistency provisions of the CZMA allow states with approved
coastal programs to influence federal actions. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1)(A) (1994). The
provisions vary slightly depending upon whether the proposed action is a direct federal
activity or development project, a federally licensed or permitted activity, or involves federal
assistance to state and local governments.
54. See 15 C.F.R. § 923.32(b) (1989).
55. 16 U.S.C. § 1455(d)(2)(B),(E).
56. 16 U.S.C. § 1455(d)(10)(A).
57. There has been some controversy about whether the Presidential Proclamation of
December 27, 1988, Proclamation No. 5928, reprintedin 3 C.F.R. at 547 (1989), extending
the U.S. territorial sea from three to twelve nautical miles for international purposes, had the
effect of extending the coverage of the Coastal Zone Management Act. The Department of
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included the power to control development of submerged lands, power to
resolve conflicts between submerged lands development and competing
water uses, and power to regulate water uses of submerged lands."8 The
intent for states to manage water resources was confirmed in the 1990
amendments to the CZMA.5 9 Contrary to this intent, to date, most states
have emphasized land-side shoreline management to the exclusion of
water-related planning.' However, this federal exhortation to use the
states' "full authority" in management, while somewhat circular, should
weigh in favor of state management in federal preemption decisions.
Federal preemption analysis is necessarily fact-specific. If there are no
federal regulations which address use priorities or impose restrictions on
a particular type of use, courts will likely allow a state to use its police
powers to impose regulations it deems appropriate. If such state regulations
are adopted in conformance with required due process procedures, they will
61
be evaluated using a rational basis test.

Justice and Office of the General Counsel of NOAA concluded that it did not extend the
coverage of the CZMA nor did it enlarge the area to which the consistency provisions of the
CZMA apply. Douglas W. Kmiec, Legal Issues Raised by the ProposedProclamationto
Extend the TerritorialSea, 1 TERR. SEA J. 1, 37 (1990); Opinion of the Office of General
Counsel, NOAA, Effect of the Territorial Sea Proclamation on the Coastal Zone
ManagementAct, 1lTER. SEAL 169, 190(1990). But see, John A. Saurenman, The Effects
of a Twelve Mile TerritorialSea on CoastalState Jurisdiction:Where Do Matters Stand?
1 TERR. SEA l. 39 (1990).

58. Opinion of the Office of General Counsel, NOAA, supra note 57, at 175.
59. The 1990 amendments to the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 (Coastal
Zone Act Reauthorization Amendments of 1990, P.L. 101-508) established the Coastal Zone
Enhancement Grants Program to encourage states to strengthen federally-approved coastal
management programs in eight areas, one of which was "planning for the use of ocean
resources." 16 U.S.C. § 1456b (1994). However, of seventy-three projects funded to
address priority issues, only three addressed the ocean resources issue (Massachusetts, North
Carolina, and Oregon). Ocean resource planning was also identified as a priority in
American Samoa, California and Hawaii, but was not funded or no funding was requested.
Tina Bernd-Cohen et al., Review of the Section 309 CoastalStates Enhancement Grants

Program,23 COASTAL MGMT. 173, 182 (1995).
60. Bernd-Cohen, supra note 59, at 184-85.
61. For example, faced with growing use conflicts, Hawaii enacted a ban on the
weekend and holiday use of commercial "thrill craft" in certain bays. In Kaneohe Bay
Cruises, Inc. v. Hirata, 861 P.2d 1 (Haw. 1993), challengers argued that the state was
preempted from instituting restrictions on these craft because 1)the federal government has
not put any use restrictions on the waters of the particular bay so the state is also preempted
from doing so, and 2) federal law preempts the field of required performance standards for
safety equipment in recreational vessels, so the state is precluded from restricting
commercial thrill craft operations in the bay. Id. at 9. The court rejected both arguments as
non-sequiturs, stating that the fact that the federal government has not itself chosen to
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C. Example: FederalPreemption and Restrictions on Anchoring
State and local governments increasingly regulate boat anchoring due
to conflicts with natural resource harvesters, commercial fishermen,
environmentalists, and shorefront residents.6 2 Boaters have challenged the
authority of state and local governments to regulate vessel anchorage on
public submerged lands, asserting federal preemption, the supremacy of
federal law in the field of navigation, and the insufficiency of state delegation to local entities.63
In Florida, numerous communities, driven primarily by shorefront
landowners, have adopted local anchoring restrictions. Some ban anchoring outright, while others impose anchorage limits as short as twelve to

impose restrictions does not mean that the state cannot opt to do so; the field is left open for
the state to "legitimately exercise its own inherent police power in this area." Id. The court
stated that federal preemption is more likely if there is a pervasive scheme of federal
regulation which leaves no room for the states to supplement it, or if the federal interest is
so dominant that it appears to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject, or if
the state and federal laws are inconsistent, making the state statute void to the extent of the
conflict. Id. However, it should be noted that even if federal preemption does not preclude
state or local regulation, other legal principles may prevent state or local bans on particular
types of vessels. See Buckley v. City of Redding, No. 93-17277, 66 F.3d 188, 1995 U.S.
App. LEXIS 33286 (9th Cir. Sept. 13, 1995) (ban on personal watercraft was struck down
on contractual grounds). But see Personal Watercraft Indus. Ass'n v. Department of Commerce, 48 F.3d 540 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (regulation limiting the use of personal watercraft on
waters of the Monterey Bay National Marine Sanctuary was upheld as it was permissible to
single out personal watercraft from other kinds of vessels because of their heightened threat
to resources due to the small size, maneuverability and high speed). See also Atlantic Prince
Ltd. v. Jorling, 710 F. Supp. 893 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (New York was enjoined from enforcing
a statute prohibiting boats longer than 90 feet from fishing in New York coastal waters when
the court held that it was discriminatory in practical effect). But see Davrod Corp. v. Coates,
971 F.2d 778 (1st Cir. 1992) (court upheld a Massachusetts law imposing a 90-foot length
restriction on fishing vessels which applied to all vessels wherever berthed).
62. New regulations have been spawned by a variety of issues including privacy
demands of shorefront residents; public health concerns about long-term live-aboards; and
natural resource, habitat, water quality and other environmental concerns. The legal issues
vary in accordance with the functions and values the regulations are designed to protect.
63. While full discussion is beyond the scope of this inquiry, these local anchoring
restrictions also raise questions about the legal adequacy of the public purpose used to justify
restrictions on anchoring and navigation. Such public purposes have included aesthetic
sensitivities and privacy concerns of shorefront landowners; the desires of cruising boat
owners for a "wilderness experience; habitat and water quality concerns (e.g., to protect
shellfish beds, submerged vegetation); protection of endangered and/or threatened species;
equitable use of submerged lands by different users; and public health and safety, including
minimizing hazards to navigation.
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seventy-two hours.6" To achieve some uniformity, Florida is considering
enacting state guidelines which would preclude local governments from
adopting more restrictive standards and would invalidate existing, more
restrictive anchoring laws.6"
In California, motivated at least in part by public health concerns, and
armed with special enabling legislation and extensive comprehensive plans,
San Diego Bay's Unified Port District designated certain areas for mooring
and anchoring boats, and prohibited anchoring-at-will in the rest of the bay.
This action, which was carefully coordinated with the United States Coast
Guard, but still hotly contested by long-term, live-aboard occupants,
survived court challenge in 1992.
Similarly, the State of Hawaii banned all anchoring and mooring within
ocean waters or navigable streams of the state without the possession of a
permit from the Department of Land and Natural Resources.67 Focusing on
issues of federal preemption, the United States District Court upheld
Hawaii's regulations in 1993, finding that states have concurrent authority
with the federal government and may adopt state regulations so long as they
do not conflict with Coast Guard regulations."

64. See Charles E. Heckler et al., Boaters Seeking FirmAnchorage, MIAMI HERALD,
July 4, 1993, at 1B (Miami Shores and Indian Creek prohibit anchoring, Fort Lauderdale
imposes a 24-hour limit on anchoring); Naftali Bendavid, St. Lucie to Boat Owners: Bon
Voyage, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 22, 1990, at 1B (St. Lucie County Commissioners prohibit
boat anchoring more than 14 days a month in County waters on penalty of 60 days in jail and
$500 fine; Longboat Key forbids mooring more than 48 straight hours; and Vero Beach
forbids overnight anchoring outside marinas); Scott Benarde, Local Laws Restrict
Live-Aboards, PALM BEACH POST, Oct. 9, 1990, at 4D (town of Jupiter restricts anchoring
to 96 continuous hours, Fort Pierce only allows mooring for 72 hours a month outside
marinas, and Riviera Beach requires a permit, valid for up to 7 days, to anchor in its harbor,
and may impound a boat without a permit anchored in its harbor for more than 24 hours).
65. Uniform Anchoring GuidelinesMake Headway, BOATIU.S. REP., Nov. 1993, at
1.
66. Graf v. San Diego Unified Port Dist., 7 Cal. App. 4th 1224 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
67. HAw. REv. STAT. § 200-6 (1993). The statute does not apply to vessels owned by
the United States, vessels engaged in interstate or foreign commerce, or pleasure craft or
fishing vessels temporarily anchored for a period of less than 72 hours.
68. Hawaiian Navigable Waters Preservation Soc'y v. Hawaii, 823 F. Supp. 766 (D.
Haw. 1993). In this case, a boaters' association challenged the constitutionality of all state
regulations and legislation affecting the rights of boaters to anchor and navigate in ocean
waters surrounding the islands of Hawaii. Plaintiffs argued that federal government had
explicitly and implicitly preempted Hawaii's regulations by the federal Submerged Lands
Act, federal laws on special anchorage grounds, and federal safety regulations. The court
rejected the preemption claim, explaining that it started with an assumption that state police
powers are not superseded by federal law unless that was the "clear and manifest purpose
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However, in a decision rejecting the validity of a local regulation, a
Florida appeals court judge recently overturned a criminal trespass conviction of a boater who refused to comply with a local anchoring restriction
which banned nighttime anchoring. 69 Giving the boater's "federally
protected rights to anchor" priority over the local regulation, the court
reportedly held that the state was unable to show that the regulation was
rational, necessary, and supported by sufficient competent evidence, as
required to support a state police power restriction on a federally protected
right to navigate.70
In connection with this growing anchoring controversy in Florida and
elsewhere, the U.S. Coast Guard issued a legal opinion concluding that
there is no "clearly preemptive federal regulatory scheme" so "states may
regulate anchoring on waters under their jurisdiction."'
Those state
regulations would be permissible so long as they are not in conflict with
federal law. They would be impermissible only if the state regulation is in
actual conflict with a federal statute or if the state regulation unduly
burdens interstate commerce.72 The Coast Guard has indicated that its

of Congress." Relying on U.S. Supreme Court cases, the district court determined that the
implicit preemption could be found if: 1) Congress implicitly occupies the field through
pervasive regulation that leaves no room for the States to supplement it; or 2) the federal
interest is so dominant that it is assumed to preclude the enforcement of state laws on the
same subject; or 3) there is an actual conflict between federal law and local regulation,
preempting the local regulation. The court found that in the Submerged Lands Act,
Congress retained only concurrent, not exclusive, jurisdiction over navigable waters of the
states. Similarly, there was no actual conflict between state and federal regulations,
including those establishing a "special federal anchorage." Because Congress did not intend
to occupy the entire field of navigation and there was no actual conflict between state and
federal law, the court held the state laws were not preempted by federal law.
69. Judge Throws Out Anchoring Restriction, BOATIU.S. REP., Jan. 1994, at 3. The
operator of a sailboat refused to comply with a state park policy that allowed daytime
anchoring but prohibited nighttime anchoring.
70. Id.
71. Memorandum from Chief Counsel P.E. Versaw, United States Coast Guard to
Chief, Office of Navigation Safety and Waterways Services (Jan. 7, 1993) (on file with the
Ocean and CoastalLaw Journal).
72. Memorandum from Acting Chief R.A. Knee, Maritime and International Law
Division, United States Coast Guard to Chief Counsel, P.E. Versaw, United States Coast
Guard (Dec. 30, 1992) (on file with the Ocean and Coastal Law Journal). Except for one
case in which the township conceded that it could not pass a total prohibition on temporary
mooring or temporary anchoring of floating homes within the jurisdiction, the Coast Guard
analysis found no cases in which state or local regulations affecting the right to anchor had
been invalidated under the Commerce Clause. Id. at 6 (citing Bass River Assocs. v. Mayor
of Bass River Township, 743 F.2d 159 (3rd Cir. 1984) (in which a ban on permanent
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primary concerns are that navigation safety not be compromised and that
commerce not be unduly restricted. The Coast Guard indicated that it will
leave it to individual boaters to raise claims of undue infringement on the
right of navigation.73
As illustrated by these cases, while the interplay of state and federal
authority can be complex, within very broad parameters imposed by
federally reserved rights in states-owned lands, states and their subdivisions have a great deal of flexibility to manage uses and minimize conflicts
in states' coastal waters. State and local governments are just beginning to
test the limits of this authority. Further, it may be possible for state and
local governments to minimize federal preemption questions by coordinating with federal agencies prior to adoption of regulations.

floating homes was upheld). Courts might construe narrow restrictions on vessel anchoring,
including durational limits, to be an unreasonable restriction on the right of navigation, but
there is little case law on point. Id. at 7. Regardless, a total bar on passage through navigable waters is impermissible.
73. Letter from J.W. Kime, Admiral, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard to Michael
Sciulla, Vice President, Boat Owners Ass'n ofthe United States (Jan. 19, 1993) (on file with
the Ocean and CoastalLaw Journal). After reviewing inherent state police power, federal
preemption, the Coastal Zone Management Act and when state regulation affecting interstate
commerce is permissible, Kime concludes:
[S]tates do have the authority to enact anchorage regulations as long as their
regulation does not actually conflict with Federal law. The Coast Guard
designates special anchorage areas, usually at the request of local municipalities,
solely for the purpose of exempting vessels of less than 65 feet from the federal
requirements of exhibiting anchor lights and sounding signals while anchored
in the designated anchorage area. Concurrent state or local regulation within
these areas has been a long-standing practice which the Coast Guard has
encouraged and one that the courts have upheld. The Coast Guard's primary
concern regarding anchoring is that navigation safety is not compromised and
commerce is not restricted.
The status of state anchorage regulations as an undue infringement upon the
right of navigation has not been clearly determined by case law and is a question
more properly directed at the courts by individual boaters. Our nation's
waterways serve a multitude of competing interests. As these waterways become
more congested and environmental resources threatened, coordinating this
multiple use becomes imperative. How to manage waterway use to preserve and
enhance navigability is a question that cannot be answered solely at the Federal
level.
Id. at 2-3.
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III. STATE AND LOCAL MARINE USE CONFLICT
RESOLUTION FRAMEWORK: MAINE CASE STUDY

Any marine conflict resolution strategy will have to address two
over-arching difficulties: the uncoordinated, single issue approach typical
of existing marine resource regulation and management; and, the complex
split between federal and state jurisdiction. State policy makers will also
have to consider: 1) whether the state already has a policy designating
marine use priorities; 2) how the state/local division of authority will affect
decision making for coastal waters; and 3) whether state mechanisms and
institutions exist which are capable of resolving conflicts and implementing
decisions about use priorities for coastal waters.
These three factors vary from state to state and can only be analyzed
within the context of a specific state. The State of Maine seems to be fairly
typical of coastal states which have recognized the problem of increasing
use conflicts but have not yet taken concrete steps to rectify the situation.
A. Background
Maine is heavily dependent on its coastal and ocean resources for its
cultural identity and economic well-being. Approximately two-thirds of
Maine's residents live in coastal communities.7 4 A study of the economic
value of Maine's coastal zone estimates that in 1985, 34.3% of the State's
share of the GNP was attributable to coast related activities.7 5
In Maine, as in other coastal states, use conflicts are increasing. A
1992 report by the Marine Policy Committee of the Land and Water
Resources Council 76 found that intensifying use of the state's marine waters

74. ME. STATE PLANNING OFFICE, THE COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT ACT: A
RESOURCE BOOK FROM MAINE 7 (1995).
75. CTR. FOR URBAN AND REG'L STUDIES, supra note 8, at 18. Coastal GNP is
composed of "coast-dependent activities" such as water-dependent uses, "coast-linked
activities" like fish processing and marine equipment suppliers, and "coastal service
activities" including economic activities that are located in the coastal zone. Id.
76. The Marine Policy Committee of the Land and Water Resources Council is a
subcommittee composed of the heads of relevant State agencies or their designees. It was
established in 1991 to facilitate information exchange among agencies, to identify issues of
concern, and develop necessary marine policies. The 1992 report analyzed the increasing
level of use of Maine's coastal waters, inventoried the marine involvement of 144 coastal
towns, 28 state agencies and 16 federal agencies, and identified management issues.
CATENA ET AL., supra note 31, at 62, 68.
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is threatening productivity and posing important and complex management
challenges:
In some regions of the state it is becoming increasingly difficult to
accommodate these multiple-and often-conflicting uses and
protect the marine environment. In addition, as the uses of the
marine environment increase and problems become more complex,
coordination among the numerous state and federal agencies
becomes more critical, yet more problematic."
However, despite the importance of Maine's marine waters, like many
other coastal states, Maine has not been aggressive in planning for or
managing the use of state waters. The 1992 study found there is no
comprehensive planning and no comprehensive policy for the use of
Maine's coastal waters." In addition, the study found the state is greatly

77. kd. at i.
78. A review ofthe Maine state laws most applicable to submerged lands supports this
conclusion about a lack of a comprehensive management scheme. Relevant laws include:
The Protection and Improvement of Waters Act, ME. Rnv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 361-372,
411-424, 451-452, 464-470 (West 1989 & Supp. 1994) (dividing Maine's estuarine and
marine waters into three classifications, SA, SB and SC, and setting allowable standards for
discharges); the Site Location of Development Law, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 481490J (West 1989 & Supp. 1994) (providing for state review of developments likely to
substantially affect the local environment); the Mandatory Shoreland Zoning Law, ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 435-449 (West 1989 & Supp. 1994) (requiring municipalities to
regulate shoreland development consistent with mandatory minimum standards); the Land
Use Regulation Law, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 681-689 (West 1994) and Land Use
Regulatory Commission Rules and Regulations, Ch. 10 as of May, 1990 (reviewing
land-side development in unorganized and deorganized townships including some coastal
islands); the Natural Resources Protection Act, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 480-A 480-V (West 1989 & Supp. 1994) (requiring permits for activities that may adversely affect
listed resources of state significance, including "coastal wetlands" (defined as all tidal and
subtidallands)); the Oil Discharge Prevention & Pollution Control Law, ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 38, §§ 541-560 (West 1989 & Supp. 1994) (promoting immediate cleanup of oil
spills and speedy settlement of third-party claims); the Marine Resources Law, ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 6001-6956 (West 1994 & Supp. 1994) (allowing the Commissioner
of the Department of Marine Resources, with advice and consent of advisory council, to
adopt regulations to promote the conservation and propagation of marine organisms and to
prevent gear conflicts among harvesters of marine organisms, accommodating the needs of
all interested parties to the maximum extent possible); the Coastal Management Policies Act,
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 1801-1803 (West 1989) (directing state, local, and certain
federal agencies to conduct their activities consistent with nine policies relevant to marine
waters); the Submerged Lands Act, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 558-A (West 1994)
(giving the Bureau of Public Lands of the Department of Conservation the power to grant
leases and charge rent for permanent uses occupying state owned submerged and intertidal
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hampered in resolving conflicts among competing uses because it lacks
priority-setting criteria and adequate information about the marine ecosystem. There is also inadequate coordination among local, state, and federal
agencies, each of which is responsible for managing discrete aspects
affecting the use of marine waters.79
The 1992 report concludes that to adequately plan for and manage its
marine environment, the state of Maine needs a comprehensive multiple-use policy for submerged lands, a unified state-wide agenda or plan,
and an improved institutional arrangement to coordinate policy, planning
and management in the marine environment."s
While this report has stimulated some discussion among Maine
regulators, due to the primacy of other issues, the momentum for action
seems to have flagged. However, given steadily increasing use, at some
time the state will be forced to refocus its attention on management of its
marine waters. The following assessment of articulated priorities, division
of authority between state and local governments, and institutional readiness provides additional analysis for such a continuing discussion.
B. Maine's Policy on Marine Resource Priorities
A basic starting point for approaching use conflict resolution is to
examine the extent to which the State of Maine already has policies which
establish marine resource priorities. The primary vehicles for establishing
such a hierarchy are the state's public trust doctrine, its submerged lands
leasing laws, and its coastal management policies.
1. Public Trust Doctrine
The "public trust doctrine," a set of principles embodied in American
property law, generally holds that all tidelands and lands under navigable
waters are owned by the states, subject to a "public trust" for the benefit of
all their citizens for certain rights of usage."s The precise scope of the

lands for terms of up to thirty years if it will not unreasonably interfere with public rights to
the intertidal or submerged lands and the waters above those lands).
79. CATENA, ET AL., supra note 31, at ii-iii.
80. Id.
81. The public trust doctrine, as an expression of societal values and priorities, can be
used to measure whether the state legislature and its agencies have complied with their
constitutional responsibility to act only for the benefit of the general public. The doctrine
can be used to construe the intent of legislation pertaining to submerged lands, and to define
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doctrine varies from state to state. 2 Recognized rights of usage traditionally include maritime commerce, navigation and fishing,8 3 and related
activities within the scope of those terms. However, in some states, the
doctrine has evolved to include other uses as well, such as recreation and
environmental conservation.'
During the last several years, the coastal management legal community
has revisited the public trust doctrine to gauge its utility to help resolve use
conflicts in, on, or over submerged lands.8 5 One important question is

the parameters of grants of authority to municipalities and state agencies. Mitchell M.
Tannenbaum, The Public Trust Doctrinein Maine'sSubmergedLands: PublicRights, State
Obligationand the Role of the Courts, 37 ME. L. REv. 105, 107, 151 (1985).
82. All states entered the Union on "equal footing" with the original thirteen colonies,
thus had complete power over their public trust lands. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi,
484 U.S. 469, 472 (1988). The state's powers were subject only to the federal government's
superior power, enumerated in the Constitution, over commerce, navigation, and treaty.
Upon entering the Union, each state had the power to regulate the coastal lands and waters
within their boundaries, limited by these specific federal powers. Within the broad
parameters, individual states had the authority to modify their public trust law by, for example, limiting the geographic scope, extinguishing state rights, making grants to private
individuals, or altering the definition of public trust uses. Overtime, various states, through
their legislatures and courts, have used this power so that significant differences now exist
among states. Thus, to analyze the conflict resolution potential of the public trust doctrine
in any detail, it is necessary to do so within the context of a specific state.
83. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11 (1894) (natural and primary uses public for
navigation, commerce and fishing).
84. As a common law doctrine, courts have generally held that they are not bound to
a fixed standard; the definition of public rights under the public trust doctrine may evolve
with needs. In addition to navigation, commerce, and fisheries, public trust uses have been
held to include "the right to fish, hunt, bathe, swim, to use for boating and general recreation
purposes" and "the preservation of those lands in their natural state... for scientific study,
as open space," bird and marine habitat and visual and climate benefits. Marks v. Whitney,
491 P.2d 374,380 (Cal. 1971). See also Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-bythe-Sea, 294 A.2d 47,54 (N.J. 1972) (bathing, swimming and other shore activities evolving
"to meet changing conditions and needs of the public it was created to benefit"); Kootenai
Envtl. Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc. 671 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Idaho 1983)
("dynamic ... concept... destined to expand with the development and recognition of new
public uses"). The United States Supreme Court held that the public's interests should be
broadly defined, and depending on state law may extend, for example, to fishing and
shellfishing in non-navigable waters, bathing, swimming, recreation, mineral development
or reclamation of land for urban expansion. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S.
at 482.
85. See Jack H. Archer & M. Casey Jarman, Sovereign Rights and Responsibilities:
Applying Public Trust Principlesto the Management of EEZ Space and Resources, 17
OCEAN & COASTALMGMT. 253 (1992); Ralph W. Johnson, et al., The Public Trust Doctrine
andCoastalZone Managementin Washington State, 67 WASH. L. REv. 521 (1992); Richard
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whether the doctrine indicates which uses should be given priority over
others. This would be relevant to the states' overall management goals and
to individual leasing decisions. The answer, for most states, seems to be
that the doctrine offers some very basic guidance on permissible and impermissible uses, but is of only marginal assistance in establishing priorities
among uses.86
Maine's public trust doctrine is less expansive than the doctrine of
many other states, due in large part to its application to intertidal lands. In
Maine, private ownership extends to mean low water. The Supreme
Judicial Court of Maine has held that public use of privately-owned
intertidal lands is limited to fishing, bird hunting, and navigation.87
However, the same limitations do not apply to state-owned submerged
lands.88 For submerged lands, Maine's courts have indicated a willingness

G. Hildreth, The Public Trust Doctrineand Coastaland Ocean Resources Management, 8
J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 221 (1993).
86. See ARCHER ET AL., supra note 29; Marc J. Hershman, A Word of Caution: The
Public Trust Doctrine and CoastalZone Management,8 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 237 (1993).
Questions also remain about integrating the public trust doctrine into regulatory reviews.
Washington State has developed express guidance. Following two decisions which began
to restore independent significance to the public trust doctrine (Caminiti v. Boyle, 732 P.2d
989 (Wash. 1987) and Orion Corp. v. State, 747 P.2d 1062 (Wash. 1987)), the Department
of Ecology published a handbook for shoreline permit administrators on how to incorporate
a public trust criterion into administrative reviews. The public trust review does not alter
pre-existing administrative authority but "introduces a prevailing stewardship ethic through
explicit investigation of the public trust doctrine." RALPH W. JOHNSON ET AL., THE PUBLIC
TRUST DOCTRINE HANDBOOK: ADESCRIPTION AND MODEL FOR WASHINGTON'S SHORELINE
PERMIT ADMINISTRATORS, 57 (1992).

87. In many states, intertidal lands, generally those lands between mean high water and
mean low water, are owned by the state, just as submerged lands are state-owned. However,
the minority position, applicable in Maine, Delaware, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania
holds that private ownership extends seaward to at least the mean low water mark. Maine's
Law Court has indicated that the state does not own these intertidal lands, so it can not really
be said to be the "trustee" of the public's rights in these intertidal lands; the public's rights
are more in the nature of a public easement. Bell v. Town of Wells, 510 A.2d 509, 517
(1986). In subsequent litigation, the Law Court held that the scope of this public easement
in Maine's intertidal lands is limited to those uses which were encompassed by the easement
in 1820 when Maine's constitution "confirmed the grant of the intertidal land in fee to the
upland owners and took over as the law of Maine the reserved public easement limited to
fishing, fowling, and navigation." Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 176 (Me. 1989).
Thus, public use of private intertidal lands is limited to only those uses recognized in 1820,
excluding public uses that have evolved since that date.
88. In Maine, private ownership extends to mean low water, thus only submerged
lands (and specific parcels of intertidal lands acquired by the state) are in public ownership.
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 558-A (West 1994 & Supp. 1996-1997). Submerged lands
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to extend the doctrine to include new uses which have emerged in response
to changing societal needs.8 9 While not completely settled, Maine's Law
Court is likely to find that appropriate uses of submerged lands include not
only fishing, fowling, and navigation, but also various forms of water-related commerce, recreation, and environmental conservation.
Maine's public trust doctrine imposes an important constitutional
responsibility on the state as trustee to ensure that state-owned submerged
lands, and waters over those lands, are used for the benefit of its citizens.90
Similarly, the doctrine carries with it limitations on the State's ability to
transfer an exclusive interest in those waters to private individuals." Public

are defined as those lands extending from mean low water (or from a point 1650 feet
seaward of mean high water if that is closer to mean high water, such as might be the case
in mud flats) out to the state's seaward boundary. Id. Maine's seaward boundary-is generally assumed to be three nautical miles from shore. Bureau of Pub. Lands, Submerged Lands
Rules § 1.4(S) (1992).
89. For example, in upholding a claim for recreational navigation which had been
precluded by a commercial logging obstruction of a nontidal river, the court noted that the
traditional use of the river for driving and storing logs may become secondary in importance
to the use of the river for travel and recreation. Smart v. Aroostook Lumber Co., 68 A. 527,
533 (1907). See also Opinion of the Justices, 437 A.2d 597, 607 (Me. 1981) (in which the
court stated traditional uses of navigation, fishing, and fowling remain important, but other
uses, such as recreation, have grown up as well).
The legislature has also addressed an evolving public trust. In 1969, as part of Maine's
Oil Discharge Prevention and Pollution Control Act, the legislature declared that the
"highest and best uses of the seacoast of the State," presumably including waters as well as
coastal lands, are:
[P]ublic and private recreation and solace from the pressures of an industrialized
society, and as a source of public use and private commerce in fishing,
lobstering and gathering other marine life used and useful in food production
and other commercial activities.
And that such uses can only be served effectively by maintaining the coastal
waters, estuaries, tidal flats, beaches and public lands adjoining the seacoast in
as close to a pristine condition as possible taking into account multiple use
accommodations necessary to provide the broadest possible promotion of public
and private interests with the least possible conflicts in such diverse uses.
38 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 38, § 541 (West 1994). Interestingly, this declaration adds
recreation, solace from the pressures of an industrialized society, and marine environmental
protection to the public trust uses offishing, fowling, and navigation traditionally recognized
at that time. While the substantive provisions of the Act are confined to regulating the
discharge of oil within the state, the findings are instructive.
90. Opinion of the Justices, 437 A.2d 597, 606 (Me. 1981); Op. Att'y Gen. No. 82-33
(June 2, 1982).
91. The limits on the transfer of an exclusive interest in those waters to private
individuals is relatively clear. the state, through its agencies, may only authorize a private
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trust concepts have been invoked in individual cases when the judiciary
was called upon to resolve fact-specific disputes between conflicting uses.'
However, the judiciary has properly refrained from developing any more
comprehensive formulation of priorities. Thus, in Maine, as in other states,
the public trust doctrine and interpretive case law provides little substantive
guidance on hierarchies within the broad range of public trust uses.
The public trust doctrine can be further defined through legislative
enactments, so long as they are consistent with the basic doctrine. A few
Maine laws and regulations, discussed immediately below, provide more
detailed articulation of the state's public trust doctrine.
2.

Submerged Lands in Maine

The regulation of submerged lands in Maine was consolidated in 1975
under the Bureau of Public Lands (BPL) in the Department of Conservation.93 The BPL was given the responsibility for control and management
of submerged and state-owned intertidal lands.94 This consolidated
responsibility supplemented scattered laws which had previously given
other state agencies or municipalities the authority to regulate specific
activities on submerged lands. 95

entity to make exclusive use of submerged lands, such as through a grant, lease or easement,
if the authorization is reasonable, for the benefit of the people, and not repugnant to any
other provision of the Maine or United States Constitution. Opinion of the Justices, 437
A.2d 597 (Me. 1981). Typically this involves a balancing of factors including the
percentage of trust land conveyed, the type of interest granted to the private party (lease or
fee), the character of the grantee, how the land will be used, and whether there will be
continued public use or other public benefits. Tannenbaum, supra note 81, at 142-43.
92. For example, in an 1887 case interpreting the public trust doctrine, Maine's Law
Court found that it did have the authority to rule on the priority of established but conflicting
public uses because the legislature had not acted. Woodman v. Pitman, 10 A. 321 (Me.
1887). It reached a decision favoring one use, harvesting ice, over another, travel by horse
teams on a frozen river, holding that the commercial benefit of the former was more
important to the public, taking into consideration changing circumstances and relative benefits to the general public. It looked at local community benefit, stating that "common good
of all must have a decisive weight on the question of individual enjoyment." Id. at 323.
93. P.L. 1975, ch. 339, § 6 (codified as amended at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§
551-560 (West 1994 & Supp. 1997)).
94. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 552(1)(A).
95. See, e.g., id. § 549 (Maine Geologic Survey responsible for mineral development
and mining in submerged lands); Id. § 6072 (Department of Marine Resources authority to
lease submerged lands for research and aquaculture); Id. tit. 38, §§ 1021-1027 (West 1989
& Supp. 1996-1997) (wharves and weirs in intertidal and subtidal zones require municipal
license).
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The Act gives BPL the authority to convey public submerged lands to
private applicants for exclusive, private use for a period of up to thirty
years in exchange for a fee. The conveyance may take the form of an
easement, standard lease, or dredging lease.96 Such a conveyance is
required before the applicant may dredge, fill, or erect permanent97 structures such as marinas, piers, wharves, docks, pilings, restaurants, bridges,
moorings, or similar structures on, in or over
submerged lands. This state
98
lease is subject to reserved federal rights.
The practical effect of the 1975 Act was, however, greatly limited by
a "constructive easement" provision which granted all owners of
then-existing "structures" on submerged and intertidal lands an automatic
thirty-year exemption from state submerged lands reviews and lease fees.
They could continue the prior existing use without the necessity of obtaining a lease or paying compensation to the State until 2005. 99

Rough projections indicate that more than eighty percent of structures
located on, over or in state waters which would otherwise require a lease
are currently operating under the thirty-year exemption."° Thus, while the

96. Ikl tit. 12, § 551(1)(E) (West 1994 & Supp. 1996-1997).
97. "Permanent" is defined as occupying the lands during seven or more months per
year. BUREAU OFPUB. LANDS, supra note 88, § 1.4(L) (1992) (citingME. REv. STAT. ANN.

tit. 12, § 558-A(1)(B) (West 1994 & Supp. 1996-1997)).
98. The interest created by the Submerged Lands Leasing Program remains subject to
the reserved federal rights in state-owned coastal waters. In Donnell v. United States, 834
F. Supp. 19 (D. Me. 1993), a wharf owner challenged an order of the Army Corps of
Engineers requiring the owner to remove a 20-foot section of the wharf. The court held that
the wharf owner's state-granted constructive easement over the submerged land was always
subject to the federal government's control regarding navigation pursuant to the Commerce
Clause. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineer's order to remove, acting pursuant to the
Commerce Clause, was permissible and was not a taking, despite the state granted easement
in the state-owned submerged lands. Id.
99. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 558-A(6) (West 1994 & Supp. 1996). That
constructive easement terminates October 1, 2005 or sooner if the owner ceases or
substantially changes the use. The enactment of the Submerged Lands Act was followed by
an opinion of the Attorney General's office that the term "structure" in the Act included fill
on formerly submerged or intertidal lands which were filled prior to October 1, 1975. The
ensuing debate about whether "owners" held the land in fee or only pursuant to an easement
which would expire in thirty years was eventually resolved by the passage of a provision
relinquishing all state claims to these formerly filled submerged lands. Id. § 559. An
opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court concluded that the title-clearing legislation giving up
any state interest in these formerly filled tidelands did not violate the public trust. Opinion
of the Justices, 437 A.2d 597 (Me. 1981). See also Tannenbaum, supranote 81, at 138-40.
100. Clarke Canfield, Survey to Count All Structures on the State's Waters, ME.
SUNDAY TELEGRAM,

Dec. 2, 1990, at B14.
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submerged lands leasing program has provided important oversight for uses
commencing after 1975, to date it has had no impact on the vast majority
of permanent, private uses of submerged lands.
If not sooner amended, in 2005, the submerged lands leasing program
could become a much more important tool for implementing state management policies. Two of the stated purposes of the submerged lands program
are to balance competing uses and to regulate private use, considering the
impacts of private use on the public's ability to use and enjoy trust rights,
and the public's right to fair compensation for allowing private use.'"' The
public trust uses which may take place without a lease or easement include
transitory fishing, fowling, recreation, navigation, and other customary or
traditional uses whereby the public may use or enjoy the waters, submerged
lands, and associated natural resources of the State.' °2 Addressing the
potential for conflict, the 1986 policy manual for submerged lands management asserts "[cloordinated management is necessary to resolve the
increasing number of conflicts that may arise between development and
preservation of environmental quality, resource conservation and public
rights to use these resources."' 3 It notes that numerous state and federal
laws, specifically including resource protection laws, also apply to submerged lands, and that other state agencies and municipalities share
management responsibilities with BPL. Using as its guide the need to
"provide the greatest long-term benefits for all the people in Maine," the
1986 policies stated:
To this end, leases and easements have been prioritized in terms
of their impact on public rights, customs and uses. Leases and
easements determined to be most desirable are those issued for
uses which depend on the water and/or submerged lands for their
existence and which make wise use of the natural renewable
resources therein. Leases and easements deemed to be least
desirable are those issued for uses which are not dependent on the
water and/or submerged lands and which cause irreversible
changes therein. Since private use of submerged land unavoidably
restricts general public use of this resource, fees shall be imposed
on those private users."
101. BUREAU OF PUB. LANDS, supranote 88, at pmbl. & § 1.2.
102. Id. § 1.4(P).
103. BUREAU OF PUB. LANDS, SUBMERGED LANDS PROGRAM RULES AND POLICIES

MANUAL § 3.2 (1986).
104. Id.
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The details of the lease requirements have changed over time, 5 but the
basic priorities have been consistent. Highest rents are charged for upland
uses and fill."° Recreational boat slip space is generally next highest,
followed by commercial fishing boat slip space and water dependent
commerce, industry, and private uses.'(' The lowest assessed fee is for
commercial fishing facilities.' No lease fee is charged for publicly owned
facilities offering public access -atfree or nominal rates, structures utilized
by municipal sewer and water districts, or port facilities providing a
significant public benefit which are an essential component of the marine
waterway infrastructure.'0 9
The incentives incorporated in the lease rates are supplemented by
standards to address public trust concerns. For example, in addition to
being required to pay higher lease fees, applicants for upland uses must also
prove that they are an essential part of a commercial fishing or waterdependent use and there is no other reasonable alternative site available." 0
These standards generally protect public trust uses, but provide little
practical guidance on use conflicts. For example, one standard states that
the director may deny a lease if it would "unreasonably interfere with
customary or traditional public access ways to, or public trust rights in, on
or over the intertidal or submerged lands and the waters above those
lands.'
Other standards give more guidance on use priorities. For
example, the lease standards incorporate a preference for commercial

105. It has evolved from flat fees per square foot varying with use, to a system of fees
based on a percent of assessed value of the adjacent upland, with the percent varying with
use. A different system is used for marinas. BUREAU OFPUB. LANDS, supra note 88, § 1.8

106. Id.
107. Il

108. Id.
109. This describes the 1990 rate structure, based on a varying percent of the assessed
per square foot value of the adjacent upland. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. § tit. 12, § 558-A (West
1994 & Supp. 1997). The 1985 rates used the same priorities, but established a flat rate
across the state; the basic fee was $.04 per square foot for upland uses, $.02 for water
dependent or water associated uses, and $.01 for commercial use of renewable aquatic resources. BUREAU OFPUB. LANDS, supra note 103, § 3.8. In response to protests by marina
operators, 1991 amendments further changed the rental fee for slip space by basing it on
gross income rather than assessed value of the adjacent upland. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
12, § 558-A (1994). The lease fees are also adjusted by annual increases.
110. For example, under the 1992 rules, upland uses and fill will not be permitted on
submerged land unless "they are for an essential but subsidiary part of a commercial fishing
use, water dependent use, shoreland stabilization, cable, or pipeline" and there is no other
reasonable alternative site available. BUREAU OFPUB. LANDS, supra note 88, § 1.6(B)(18).
111. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 558-A (2).
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fishing activities. To grant a lease, the director must find that it will not
unreasonably interfere with navigation, fishing or other existing marine
uses of the area, ingress and egress of riparian owners, nor will it "unreasonably diminish the availability of services and facilities necessary for
commercial marine activities. ' The rules provide additional guidance on
how to evaluate impacts upon commercial fishing industries or infrastructure." 3 The priority for commercial fishing and other commercial marine
activities applies not just to direct conflicts such as proposed recreational
berthing which would displace existing fish boat berthing, but also to less
direct conflicts which would nonetheless reduce economic viability of
commercial fishing." 4

112. Id. § 558-A (2)(A)(6).
113. The rules state:
For consideration of impacts upon commercial fishing industries or infrastructure, the following guidelines shall apply:
a. The use will not result in the loss or unreasonable diminishment of opportunity to economically pursue commercial fishing for the operators of any
commercial fishing vessels that will be displaced;
b. The use will not result in a loss of access or unreasonable diminishment of
access to existing commercial fishing grounds.
c. The use will not result in a loss or unreasonable reduction of repair and
maintenance services essential for commercial fishing operations.
d. The use will not result in a loss of fish buying, processing, or handling
facilities that are in operation at the time of the application.
e. The use will not result in a loss or unreasonable diminishment of access to
existing commercial fishing facilities.
BUREAU OF PUB.LANDS, supra note 88, § 1.7(C)(4).
114. See, e.g., the proposal of Mount Desert Realty Trust for a recreational marina and
"boatel" (lodging for marine travelers) in Bass Harbor on Mount Desert, Maine which was
denied by BPL, in part, because it might have caused the number of commercial fishing
vessels in the vicinity to support critical repair services for that type of vessel. BPL found:
1. There is evidence that the marina will unreasonably interfere with the ability of
commercial fishermen to continue to economically pursue their livelihood in Bass
Harbor.
2. There is evidence that the marina will unreasonably diminish the availability of
services and facilities necessary for commercial marine activities.
3. Bass Harbor is important to the Mount Desert Island region as a commercial fishing
harbor. Any impacts to the industry in Bass Harbor must be considered cumulatively
with the impacts that have already occurred within the region.
In re Mount Desert Realty Trust, Findings & Decision, BPL, Mar. 11, 1991. The complaint
challenging the decision as arbitrary and capricious was dismissed by stipulation. Mount
Desert Realty Trust v. Bureau of Pub. Lands, No. CV-91-455 (Me. Super. Ct., Ken. Cty.,
Nov. 21, 1991) (stipulation of dismissal).
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Additional standards to minimize conflicts require the director to
consider traffic congestion, 5 marine habitats or similar protected areas," 6
and consistency with certain Coastal Policies." 7 Similarly, the lease will
not be granted if it fails to comply with requirements of other state, federal
or municipal
agencies with jurisdiction over the area of the proposed
8
project."
In summary, the submerged lands leasing program incorporates general
public trust principles, but also goes beyond those principals to establish a
hierarchy of uses. New uses are not favored if they will unreasonably
interfere with commercial fishing or existing marine uses. Non-water

dependent uses are not favored.

Commercial fishing industries and

9 receive

special consideration in lease decisions.
infrastructure"
Despite its carefully crafted priorities, to date the submerged lands
leasing program has only a very limited impact on use of the state's coastal
waters. The program itself has limited public support. 2 ° It affects only

new uses or a significant change in existing uses, so has not yet been
applied to the vast majority of uses in existence in 1975. It applies only to
non-exempt uses that occupy submerged lands on a "permanent," exclusive
basis; some permanent uses are exempt from BPL jurisdiction' and

115. "The use will not result in a significantly increased risk to life or property in the
vicinity of the use under conditions of weather and vessel traffic that are likely to be
encountered." BUREAU

OF PUB.LANDS,

supra note 88,

§ 1.7(C)(5).
116. "The use will not conflict with established management guidelines designed to
protect marine habitats or other areas of submerged lands which have been designated for
special protection status by an agency authorized to make such designations." Id. § 1.7(C)7.
117. Id. § 1.7(C)(8). "The use does not conflict with those aspects of the Coastal
Policies or the Coastal Policy guidelines ...which relate to the criteria considered by the
Bureau as outlined in these rules."
118. Id. § 1.7(C)(6).
119. Defined to include landing, processing, loading, or selling of shellfish, finfish
or natural renewable products of the sea or aquaculture products, fish piers, lobster
impoundments, fish processing facilities, fuel and ice facilities, berthing for fishing boats,
and floats or piers for the storage of gear. Id. § 1.4(C).
120. Marina operators and others continue to challenge the concept that they should
have to pay rent to the state for the right to have a permanent use on publicly owned lands.
In 1995 a compromise was reached and the Act was amended to place a cap of $1,200 per
year on rent. An Act to Amend the Law Regarding the Lease of Submerged Lands, c. 666,
sec. 6, 1995 (codified as amended at 12 M.R.S.A. § 558-A(2)(E) (West Supp. 1997)).
121. For example, submerged lands leases for marine research and aquaculture
facilities are governed by the Department of Marine Resources, not BPL. Similarly,
water-dependent uses less than 500 square feet, commercial fishing uses which occupy less
than 2,000 square feet, certain state bridges, harbor improvement by the federal government,
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exercise of non-exclusive public trust rights are not governed by the
program."' The submerged lands leasing program, important as it is, is not
a substitute for a comprehensive plan for the use of marine waters.
3.

Aquaculture Leasing Program

Leases of submerged lands for scientific research and aquaculture are
issued by the Department of Marine Resources (DMR) rather than the
Bureau of Public Lands.2 3 DMR leases are required for finfish culture in
nets, pens, or other enclosures and for suspended culture of any other
marine organism."
Various mechanisms to balance uses of the area are built into the
application process. DMR considers: physical and ecological impacts of
the proposed projects on existing uses, potential uses, and on commercially
and ecologically significant flora and fauna; the degree of exclusivity
required by the proposed use; possible conflicts with traditional fisheries;
and possible impact on municipally-designated or traditional storm
anchorages in proximity to the proposed lease.'2' The lease may be granted
if it will not unreasonably interfere with: ingress and egress of riparian
owners; navigation; "fishing or other uses of the area taking into consideration the number and density of aquaculture leases in an area;"1 26 existing
ecologically significant flora and fauna; and public use or enjoyment within
27
1,000 feet of publicly-owned parks or docking facilities.
In addition, the statute indicates preferences to be applied in the
relatively unlikely event that more than one person applies to lease the
same area for aquaculture or scientific research. First preference goes to
DMR, followed by the riparian owner of the intertidal zone within the
leased area,12 1 then "fishermen who have traditionally fished in or near the
proposed lease area," and next the riparian owner within 100 feet of leased
single moorings for vessels less than 65 feet in length, and single family residential water
intake pipes are exempt from the lease requirements. BUREAU OF PUB. LANDS, supra note
88, § 1.5.
122. Id.
123. ME.REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 6071 (West 1994 & Supp. 1997).
124. Id. § 6072 (1-A). The lease can be for up to 10 years, for tracts of not more than
5 acres; contiguous lease tracts can be granted to a single applicant, up to limits of 100 acres
for a single, lease, and an aggregate of up to 200 acres per person. Id. § 6072(2), (2)(E).
125. Id. §§ 6072(5-A), 6072(4) (D-1), (D-2).
126. Id. § 6072(7-A).
127. Id. § 6072(7-A).
128. Assuming the lease tract includes intertidal land.
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coastal waters' 29 If the contest is between an applicant for a submerged
lands lease and an aquaculture lease, the Commissioners of the two
departments
are to determine which project "is in the best interest of the
30
State.,1
The statute does not include criteria to address impact on views or
property values of upland owners nor does it give special consideration to
objections or claims of riparian owners unless the lease tract is on or within
100 feet of privately-owned intertidal land. Upland uses are not included
within the "other uses of
the area" which are to be protected from un3
reasonable interference.1 1
These criteria call for DMR to engage in a fairly comprehensive review
to miimize space and resource conflicts from new aquaculture enterprises.
DMR considers not only physical conflicts, but also Whether multiple
activities could still be accommodated on the same space. It also looks at
environmental impacts of the use on the site and in the surrounding area.
These criteria have been shaped by competing considerations; they seek to
protect traditional uses from disruption by newly emerging aquaculture
while at the same time allowing the state to enjoy the economic benefits of
this new industry. The question of what constitutes "unreasonable interference" requires a careful balancing for each application, particularly as new
forms of aquaculture emerge.
4. Coastal ManagementPoliciesAct
The submerged lands and aquaculture leasing programs both concern
physical space allocation systems. In 1986, Maine enacted the Coastal
Management Policies Act, a law which took a broader approach to
The law established nine policies deestablishing coastal priorities.
signed to respond to unprecedented shoreline development and to guide
coastal resource use. The Act's preamble stressed the importance of
"striking a carefully considered and well reasoned balance among the

129. ME. REV. STAT. AM. tit 12, § 6072(8).
130. Id. § 6072(14).

131. Harding v. Commissioner of Marine Resources, 510 A.2d 533, 536 (Me. 1986).
The court held property value diminution of upland property was not relevant to the statutory
criteria for issuance of a lease, and "other uses of the area" more likely was meant to protect
lobstering, clamming, scalloping, swimming, mooring of boats, and other activities that
traditionally take place in the areas where aquaculture is to transpire. Id.
132. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 1801-1803 (West 1989).
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competing uses of the State's coastal area,"'' 33 defined to include the area
from the inland boundary of coastal towns to three miles offshore.
By Executive Order,134 state agencies were required, and federal and
local agencies encouraged, to review their policies and, by December 31,
1987, implement necessary changes to make them consistent with the nine
policies contained in the Act.135 The Act was supplemented by a modest
document suggesting implementation procedures. 36 No mechanisms were
established for striking a balance among potentially inconsistent goals, nor
were penalties established in the Act for non-compliance.
The policy most applicable to coastal waters, the marine resource
management policy, states in full that relevant agencies must:
Manage the marine environment and its related resources to
preserve and improve the ecological integrity and diversity of
marine communities and habitats, to expand our understanding of
the productivity of the Gulf of Maine and coastal waters and to
enhance the economic value of the State's renewable marine
resources.
The Act provides a valuable starting place by articulating a policy which
grants highest priority to uses which protect ecological integrity and marine
habitats. Similarly, it stresses the value of renewable marine resources.
Beyond these general expressions, the Act and its policies fail to provide
much guidance for specific use decisions.' 37
133. Id. § 1801.
134. Me. Exec. Order No. 3 FY 86/87 (Sept. 16, 1986).
135. The Act was further implemented when these policies were incorporated by
reference into the Growth Management Act in 1987 (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 43014349 (West 1996)) and the Shoreland Zoning Act in 1989 (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §
435-449 (West 1989 & Supp. 1997)). Maine's Growth Management Act encourages
municipalities to undertake comprehensive planning. In addition to incorporating the
Coastal Management Policies Act policies, it set out ten additional policies with which local
plans are to be consistent. The main policy addressing marine issues articulates the goal "to
protect the State's marine resources industry, ports and harbors, from incompatible
development and to promote access to the shore for commercial fishermen and the public."
(ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, § 4312(3)(G) (West 1996)).
136. COASTAL ADVISORY COMM., COASTAL MANAGEMENT POLICY GUIDELINES
(1986). This was later supplemented by a 1988 document prepared for use by local officials
to assist them in incorporating the coastal management policies into newly mandated local
comprehensive plans. ME. DEP'TOFECON. AND COMMUNITY DEv., COASTAL MANAGEMENT
TECHNIQUES: A HANDBOOK FOR LOCAL OFFICIALS

(1988).

137. The Coastal Advisory Committee issued Coastal Management Policy Guidelines
which paralleled the nine policies as a "framework and context for all public and private
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Other relevant, equally brief policies note the importance of using ports
and harbors for fishing, transportation and recreation; giving preference to
water-dependent uses; protecting and managing critical habitat and natural
areas; expanding opportunities for outdoor recreation; encouraging
appropriate coastal tourist activities and development; and maintaining
water quality to "allow for the broadest possible diversity of public and
private uses."1 3s The Act itself is more of a list of concerns, with no
direction on prioritization of uses. The accompanying advisory guidelines
for policy implementation indicate a clear preference for commercial over
recreational uses, but 1that
preference is not contained in the underlying
39
legislative enactment.
Because of the brevity of the policies, lack of implementing mechanisms, and a change in administrations and department staff, this Act failed
to live up to its promise to be the framework for governmental resource
management decisions in the coastal area of Maine. Specifically, the Act
emphasizes shoreline development rather than coastal waters, and fails to
address competing water use in any significant way. State and local
agencies have continued to address issues which are also addressed in the
Act, but the Act itself was not the impetus for those activities. For example, a 1989 assessment concluded that implementation of the coastal
policies "has not occurred in a systematic manner, however, because few
state agencies and municipalities amended their decision-making processes
to specifically incorporate the policies."'" The Act is cross-referenced in
several other statutes and occasional state reports, but it is rarely utilized
to establish the theoretical context for specific marine policy decisions.
decisions affecting the future of the Maine coast." They were also extremely brief, but
identified implementation procedures for each policy. The marine resource management
policy implementation procedures included: state marine research priorities; species-specific
research and monitoring; research to minimize adverse impacts of fishing gear; comprehensive river and sports fisheries management plans; seafood marketing programs; encourage
aquaculture "where it is compatible with established fisheries;" prohibition on new or
expanded waste discharges to potentially productive shellfish producing areas; and tidal flat
management initiatives. COASTAL ADVIsORY CoMM., supranote 136, at 5. The guidelines
were to assist individual agencies in meeting their obligations under the Act.
138. ME.REv. STAT. ANN. tit.38, § 1801 (West 1989).
139. For example, the Guidelines indicate priority consideration is to be given to
significant commercial ports over others in funding port infrastructure and preference is to
be given to commercial over recreational water-dependent uses. COASTAL ADVISORY
CoMM., supra note 136, at 4.
140. STATE PLANNING OFFICE, ME.COASTAL PROGRAM, IMPLEMENTATION OF
MAINE's COASTALPOLicES 1986-1988 at 18 (submitted to Maine State Legislature, Jan. 1,
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5. Summary
The public trust doctrine assists with the definition of broad categories
of permissible and impermissible uses of submerged lands such as fishing,
fowling, navigation, recreation, and environmental protection, but is of only
marginal assistance in establishing priorities within the universe of permissible uses. Maine has made a good start, through the Submerged Lands
Leasing program, to further distinguish between water-dependent and
upland uses, commercial and recreational uses, and to develop explicit
guidelines for balancing uses that might conflict with commercial
fishing.' 4l Similarly, the aquaculture leasing standards articulate guidelines
for assessing use conflicts. But both of these programs apply only to
certain permanent uses, which constitute a small subclass of coastal water
uses, and usually, with the exception of commercial fishing, consider only
physical space conflicts. Most other efforts to control coastal development
have focused on the shoreside aspects. To the extent the coastal policies
mention the marine environment, the policies are vague and fail to address
tradeoffs among potentially conflicting uses.
C. State/Local Division of Authority Over Maine's Coastal Waters
Nearshore and harbor areas are the portion of coastal waters likely to
experience the greatest number of use conflicts. The quantity of users near
human settlements, the heightened vulnerability of marine ecosystems due
to impacts from land-based uses, the scarcity of shoreline appropriate for
land/water transfer facilities, the variety of uses conducted close to the
shoreline, and the greater natural productivity of shallow waters all contribute to the likelihood of use conflicts. Yet, it is in this area that there are
the most questions about regulatory authority, due to the overlap of state
and municipal jurisdiction.
Just as regulatory complexities arise from concurrent state and federal
jurisdiction over coastal waters,' 42 they also arise from overlapping state
and local authority over coastal waters. States can expressly delegate
authority to municipalities, can allow municipalities to exercise their home
rule authority, or can opt to preempt local regulation. However, unlike the
state-federal relationship which is based on powers originally reserved by
the federal government and statutes enacted pursuant to those powers, the

141. See supra Part III.B.2.
142. See supra Part II.B.
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state-local division of authority is somewhat more fluid; the state can opt
to alter the allocation of authority between it and its subdivisions at any
time through legislative action. '
In Maine, municipal jurisdiction over coastal waters derives from the
fact that Maine's coastal towns usually encompass some state-owned
submerged lands within their boundaries.'" Thus, through a combination
of express statutes and home rule powers,145 coastal towns have some
regulatory authority over matters occurring in, on or over submerged lands

143. For example, 1987 amendments to the Harbor Masters Act curtailed municipal
discretion in the assignment of mooring privileges. Prior to that, most towns had given
priority to municipal residents over nonresidents. Reasoning that a state resource, submerged lands, should be available to all state residents on an equal opportunity basis, the
amendment establishes a system to assign 10% of moorings to nonresidents in commercial
and noncommercial categories. MNE. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 7-A (West 1989).
144. The division of the state into various political subdivisions (counties, districts,
towns, plantations and unorganized territory) did not affect ownership of submerged lands;
ownership was retained by the state. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.1, §§ 2,3,7 (West 1989). But
each coastal town may have some state-owned submerged lands included within the town's
boundaries, and thus exercise jurisdiction over certain activities taking place on or over those
lands. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 573 (West 1994). Some towns have jurisdiction over
extensive water areas. The extent of submerged lands within a town's boundaries can only
be determined by reviewing the original act oftown incorporation. For example, Portland's
boundaries include Cushing, Great Diamond, Little Diamond, and Peaks Islands, and the
waters of Casco Bay from the mainland to beyond these islands. See, e.g.,- An Act for
Erecting that Part of the Town of Falmouth, in the County of Cumberland, into a Town by
the name of Portland, Private and Special Statutes, Massachusetts, July 4, 1786. Similarly,
the Town of Long Island, formerly part ofPortland, includes additional islands and extensive
coastal waters, spanning from a line through Hussey Sound to the mean high water line
along the Hope Island shoreline. An Act to Allow the Separation of Certain Islands in Casco
Bay from the City of Portland, Ch. 100, Private and Special Laws, Second Regular Session
1991.
145. Pursuant to its general "home rule" authority, a Maine municipality can exercise
those regulatory powers that the state could expressly delegate to it, so long as the state has
not already expressly denied that power or acted to regulate that activity with the intent that
its regulations be the only regulations. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, §§ 2003 & 3001
(West 1996 & Supp. 1996). Thus, even in the absence of a specific enabling act, because
the state could theoretically delegate powers to regulate water uses to towns, municipalities
possess a broad prerogative to regulate matters occurring within their water-side boundaries.
The limitations on this are that: 1) the regulations can only apply to activities within the
geographic boundaries of the town; and 2) the regulations may not conflict with state or
federal statutes or regulations.
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within their boundaries. 146 In theory, these municipal powers can be
employed to resolve near-shore marine use conflicts.
However, questions remain about the extent of municipal authority
over state-owned lands. Depending upon the degree of state involvement
in the project and the nature of the ordinance the municipality seeks to
enforce, the use may be exempt from municipal regulation. 47
In actual practice, municipal regulation of coastal waters has generally
been restricted to relatively simple harbor management plans which
4
allocate mooring privileges and impose simple rules for vessel safety.1
However, as use conflicts escalate, new questions are being raised about the
geographic and subject matter boundaries of municipal authority, and the
relative jurisdiction of the state over submerged lands.
The primary statute granting municipalities authority over coastal
waters is the Harbor Masters Act. 149 It gives a town authority to regulate
its harbor by appointing a harbor master to assume statutorily-defined

146. Maine does not have a law that expressly authorizes either the state or the
municipalities to regulate water areas in a comprehensive manner comparable to those laws
authorizing land-based zoning. However, the power to regulate water areas in this manner
is inherent in state sovereignty. HARRIET P. HENRY, STATE PLANNING OFFICE, COASTAL
ZONE MANAGEMENT IN MAINE: A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 71 (1973). In addition, by statute,
municipal land use ordinances control allowable uses of "land." 30 M.R.S.A. § 4301(8)
(West Supp. 1994). Municipalities may exercise their land use planning and management
authority over the "total land area within their jurisdiction." 30 M.R.S.A. § 4325 (West
Supp. 1994). If "land" is interpreted broadly to include submerged lands as well as uplands,
municipalities do have express statutory authority to manage the use of water surfaces and
submerged lands within municipal boundaries.
147. Until 1993, any municipal zoning ordinance was "only advisory" with respect
to the state. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, § 4352(6) (West 1996). See, e.g., Senders v.
Town of Columbia Falls, 647 A. 2d 93, 95 (Me. 1994). However, in 1993 the law was
amended to require that, for certain types of development, the state comply with local zoning
ordinances which are consistent with the Growth Management Act. 30-A M.R.S.A. §
4351(6) (West Supp. 1994). It is not yet clear how this will apply to private development
on leased state-owned lands.
148. Local coastal management typically addresses land-based issues. For example,
a review of 27 comprehensive plans prepared by coastal towns found their discussion of
coastal issues focused primarily on upland or intertidal use, and harbor issues. While
"marine resources" was the issue identified by the most towns, the emphasis was on
intertidal areas, such as reopening of shellfish beds. The next most frequently identified
issues were upland public access to the shoreline (desire to increase or problems created by
diminished access), port and harbor management (filled to capacity, mooring realignments,
or protection of utility for commercial users) and preservation of shorefront property for
water dependent uses. CATENA ET AL., supranote 31, at 44-45.
149. Harbor Masters Act, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § I (West 1989 & Supp.
1996).
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harbor management powers. The harbor master's actions must be consistent with the statute and with any locally enacted supplements such as a
municipal harbor management plan. The enabling statute expressly
authorizes the harbor master to control moorings, including waiting lists,
assignment, placement, fees, construction standards and appeals; designate
channel boundaries and anchorage areas; and enforce rules for safe
operation of vessels. But the Act does not limit municipal regulatory
authority to these subjects; it acknowledges that a town may adopt ordinances to regulate other aspects of the harbor as well. 5 '
Until about a decade ago, Maine's harbor masters operated with a high
degree of autonomy; oversight of the harbor master was frequently limited
to the reappointment decision. A 1986 Superior Court case held that harbor
masters alone had the power to assign moorings, to the exclusion of the
town.' In response, Maine's legislature clarified that towns could enact
regulations to supplement statutory provisions, and that those regulations
would be binding on the harbor master.'
Building on this clarification,
starting in approximately 1987, Maine's Coastal Program and other
interested groups and citizens began to encourage municipalities to form
harbor committees and to engage in more comprehensive harbor manage53
ment planning.
By virtue of the express provisions of the Harbor Masters Act, it is
beyond question that municipalities have authority to regulate individual
moorings, channels, anchorage areas, and vessel operations in the harbor.
However, as the express enabling legislation is silent on non-vessel uses of

150. The Harbor Masters Act states it is not a "limitation on the authority of
municipalities to enact ordinances to regulate... other activities in their harbors." Id. § 7.
Additional state statutes anticipate municipal harbor management or water use regulation as
well. For example, Maine recently created a Shore & Harbor Management Fund,
administered through the Bureau of Public Lands, to provide grants to municipalities to
develop harbor management plans and public access facilities. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 558-B (West 1994). The Shoreland Zoning Act was amended in 1994 to allow
municipalities to regulate "structures" located below the normal high water line of a water
body or within a wetland, which was defined to include all tidal and subtidal lands. ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 436-A(1) & 439-A(2) (West 1989 & Supp. 1996). Similarly,
municipal harbor management activities have been encouraged as part of the Growth
Management Act. (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, § 4312(G) (West 1989 & Supp. 1996).
151. South Freeport Marine, Inc. v. Freeport, No. CV-85-1001 (Me. Sup. Ct., Feb.
27, 1986).
152. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 7 (West 1989).
153. See GOVERNMENTAL SERvIcES INC., COMPREHENSIVE HARBOR PLAN FOR THE

TOWN OF SCARBOROUGH (1987);

WILLIAM PROSSER ETAL., HARBOR MANAGEMENT:

LEGAL GUIDE FOR HARBOR MASTERS AND COASTAL OFFICIALS

(1993).
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the harbor, the authority to regulate such non-vessel uses is dependent upon
an interpretation of home rule authority.154 Similarly, questions remain
about the geographic limits of the harbor master's authority, including
whether that authority extends to all coastal waters, both harbor and
non-harbor, within the town's jurisdiction.'5 5
The answer to both of these questions requires an analysis of state
preemption and an assessment of the State's willingness to allow municipalities to exercise these powers. The state, as owner of submerged lands,
retains ultimate planning and management responsibility for these public
trust lands and could opt to assert its authority to impose a regulatory
scheme which would override or preclude municipal regulations.
A 1987 Bureau of Public Lands study of harbor master authority
recognized the tension between state trust responsibilities and municipal
on-site management.156 While advocating a continuation of the traditional
system, that the authority to "manage harbors and assign mooring privileges
should continue to reside at the local government level,"' 5 7 BPL appeared
to be using "harbor management" in a very narrow sense, limited to vessel
safety and mooring issues. That recommendation was immediately
followed by a qualification:
The Bureau of Public Lands will continue to have management
responsibility for all other permanent uses of submerged land.

154. A court might ultimately find that a town may adopt regulations to control
non-vessel uses of the harbor based on its home rule authority or implied authority. The
absence of definitions of key terms such as "harbor management plan" and "activities in the
harbor" leaves some ambiguity. A partial answer might be provided by the 1994 amendment
to the Shoreland Zoning Act which gave municipalities the power to use shoreland zoning
ordinances to regulate structures in the water. ME.REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 439-A(2)
(West 1989 & Supp. 1996). By general definition, "structures" include anything built for
the enclosure of animals or property, and anything constructed with a fixed location on or
in the ground. Id. § 436-A(12). It is too early to assess the impact of this change, but it is
arguable that this amendment gives towns the express authority to use zoning to regulate
moorings, aquaculture facilities, moored floating storage sheds, floating restaurants, and
similar structures on or over submerged lands. But there may be other limitations on the
authority of municipal zoning to control state-owned and state-leased submerged lands. See
supra note 147.
155. The geographic boundaries of a "harbor" are not defined. A 1987 study
recommended that the legislature eliminate any confusion by extending the harbor masters'
authority to all waters within the jurisdiction of the town. BUREAU OF PUB. LANDS, DEP'T
OF CONSERVATION, HARBOR MASTER AUTHORITY STUDY 20 (1987). No action was taken
on that recommendation.
156. Id. at 9-10.
157. Id. at 22.
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Future demands on this resource as a whole may necessitate a
major effort to inventory the resource and allocate certain areas for
specific uses. If and when this becomes necessary, the Bureau will
work with municipalities and others involved to determine the
appropriate areas to be reserved for mooring and anchorage.a"'
As long as these questions remain, management of harbor and nearshore
areas will probably be less than comprehensive due to concerns about
which governmental entity has jurisdiction.
D. Are Maine's Mechanisms and Institutions Capable of
Resolving Marine Use Conflicts?

A recent study on states' ocean management capacity identified four
factors which indicate whether it is likely that a state will be able to initiate
and sustain ocean management efforts. 159 The focus was on more ambitious
management efforts which would encompass not only the three-mile
territorial sea but also areas out to the 200-mile exclusive economic zone.160
Four major variables were found to be most predictive of a successful
ocean management effort: (1) state ocean heritage and popular opinion
about the oceans; (2) governmental readiness, for ocean affairs; (3) the
degree of severity of ocean and coastal governance problems and the role
16
offocusing or triggering events; and (4) the degree of political readiness. '
A state which meets some, but not all, of the criteria may still have the
capacity to undertake the more limited first step, management of the state's
coastal waters rather than full-scale, 200-mile ocean management system.
Without question, Maine meets the first criterion of a state ocean
heritage. Maritime resources are highly valued as part of the state's
cultural identity and as a major component of the state's economy.
Governmental readiness for ocean affairs, the second criterion, is a
more limiting factor. There is no central entity for marine affairs in the

158. Id.
159. BILIANA CIN-SAIN ar AL., supra note 31, at 21.
160. "Ocean management" is defined to encompass both the three-mile territorial sea
and 200-mile exclusive economic zone. Id. at 11. The goals are to improve state capacity
for ocean management and to enhance the role of the states in decision-making about ocean
resources in federal waters. Id. at iii. It also implies policy integration to go beyond the
management of a single marine resource and implies stewardship of marine resources for
sustainable use. Id. at iv.
161. Id. at 21.
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state; responsibility for activities in the marine environment is divided
among approximately twenty-eight agencies in ten different departments. 62
Governors have attempted to use the Marine Policy Committee, a standing
subcommittee of the interagency Land and Water Resources Council to
63
advance interagency coordination, but the results have been uneven.
Legal tools for waterside management are relatively undeveloped, and constrained by unresolved issues.1 64 Similarly, the budget problems faced by
the state over the last several years have not been conducive to new
state-funded initiatives to address specific ocean sectors nor to study
cross-cutting marine policy issues. On the more positive side, however, the
state has committed significant resources to land-based coastal management
over the last decade through its federally-funded coastal management
program and its local comprehensive planning initiative. 65 More recently
it has made progress on regional watershed and ecosystem-based management of its estuaries. 166 The ongoing Gulf of Maine initiative 67 and Casco
Bay Estuary Project 68 evidence a willingness to explore management of
coastal and ocean waters. Similarly, an excellent baseline study on marine
waters governance issues has been completed. 69 These efforts have moved
the state into a good position to expand its concerns to state-wide waterside
aspects of the coastal zone.

162. CATENA ET AL., supra note 31, at 47.
163. The standing subcommittee was constituted for this purpose in 1991 and
produced an important report on marine policy in 1992. Id. at 52. The subcommittee has
since been disbanded as a standing committee, but the Council, as a whole, addresses aspects
of issues affecting the marine environment on an occasional basis. The Marine Policy
Committee continues to meet twice a year to serve an interagency coordinating function.
164. See supra Part III.B.5.
165. See ME. COASTAL PROGRAM, ME. STATE PLANNING OFFICE, THE COASTAL ZONE
MANAGEMENT ACT: A RESOURCE BOOK FROM MAINE (1995).

166. See JosiEQuiNTRELL&GROFLATEBo, MAINECOASTALPROGRAM, OPTIONS FOR
MANAGING MAINE'S NEAR SHORE ECOSYSTEMS (1995).

167. This effort by the states of Maine, New Hampshire and Massachusetts and
provinces of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, was initiated in 1989 to cooperatively protect
the resources of the Gulf of Maine through voluntary implementation of a Gulf of Maine
Action Plan. See THE GULF OF MAINE: SUSTAINING OUR COMMON HERITAGE (comp. By
Maine State Planning Office, 1989); COUNCIL ON THE MARINE ENV'T, THE GULF OF MAINE
ACTION PLAN (1991).
168. The Environmental Protection Agency designated Casco Bay as an estuary of
national significance in 1990. The Casco Bay Estuary Project is now implementing its
comprehensive conservation and management plan. CASCO BAY ESTUARY PROJECT, CASCO
BAY PLAN (1996).
169. CATENA ET AL., supra note 31.
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The third criterion, the degree of severity of ocean and coastal governance problems, indicates that these concerns are likely to command more
attention if there is a high degree of conflict or if there is an external threat
that catalyzes the state government and the public. The controversy could
theoretically be precipitated by conflicting demands of uses such as marine
transportation, commercial and recreational fisheries, mariculture, tourism
and other recreational uses, ocean waste disposal, military activity, marine
protected areas, and could be increased by conflicts between parallel state
agencies with different sectoral responsibilities. 7 ' However, the states
historically most active in ocean management efforts tend to have been
reacting to offshore oil and gas or marine mineral exploration and development proposals. 171 States that have not faced major proposed actions in
adjacent federal waters have tended to be fairly inactive on the issues of
ocean management.'72
To date, while Maine is experiencing generalized use conflicts and is
fully engaged in major issues surrounding the possible collapse of the
groundfish industry, it has been spared from the threat of large-scale
development actions in federal waters. It has not experienced immediate
incentives to engage in ocean management as a means of exerting more
state influence or control over proposed federal actions. Governmental and
public awareness of use conflicts and increased appreciation of the importance of marine resources might translate to support for efforts to manage
the state's coastal waters, but there is probably insufficient interest at this
time to pursue full ocean management. That could quickly change if the
state is confronted by tentative plans for development immediately outside
state waters, or if the state experiences a major oil spill' 73 or similar
externally-imposed catalyzing event.
The final criterion, political readiness, is a measure of the presence of
"ocean policy entrepreneurs" in the legislature, executive departments or
in the public; the extent of legislative and executive agreement on ocean
issues; the extent of cooperation among ocean interests to pursue

170.

CiCIn-SAIN ET AL., supranote 31, at iv.
171. Id. at 16.
172. Id. at 21.
173. Maine experienced a significant oil spill on September 27, 1996 when the 560foot tanker Julie N spilled 170,000 gallons of fuel oil into Portland Harbor and the Fore
River Estuary after striking a bridge support. Dieter Bradbury, BoardLifts Oil-SpillPilot's
License, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Oct. 10, 1996, at 1 (availablein 1996 WL 13305189).
Smaller spills also occur with some regularity. General public sentiment, however, has yet
to be galvanized into planning for full ocean management.
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cross-sector goals; and the presence of a commitment to proper implementation of legislation once enacted. 74 While Maine certainly has talented
individuals in government and the public sector who could serve these
roles, no high level staff or political leader has yet emerged to advocate for
enhanced management of ocean or state coastal waters.
This analysis suggests that ocean governance which extends beyond
the territorial sea is of relatively low priority to Maine, as the factors
conducive to an ocean management initiative, particularly the immediate
threat of undesirable development in federal waters, are not present.
However, the factors to initiate and sustain efforts to manage the state's
coastal waters are much more favorable. Popular appreciation of the state's
coastal heritage and governmental preparedness to undertake coastal waters
planning are present. Awareness of coastal problems is escalating. A
focusing event and political leadership may coalesce in the near future to
make management of this public resource a high priority for policy makers.
In the meantime, there are certain actions the state can undertake to
increase its readiness to respond to the inevitable demand for marine water
management. The Cicin-Sain study identified attributes of successful state
management capacity. 75 It concluded the "most difficult" but unavoidable
threshold requirement for such management capacity is the development of
"an authoritative, normative statement about a state's interest and preferences" in marine waters with a well-defined implementation process.'7 6
The study observes:
The policy objectives need to be stated in sufficient detail so that
they are an effective guide to action. This will require reference
to specific ocean uses, reference to ocean zones, and prioritization,
whenever possible. Policy objectives that state the rationale
behind them and their ultimate purpose give decision makers
clearer guidance....
Developing policy statements will require coming to grips with
values about the ocean. Is a multiple use philosophy possible? If
so, how is it achieved in a fluid environment? Can the ocean be
divided into zones for different activity, similar to what has been
done in land use control? Are performance standards required?

174. CICIN-SAIN ET AL., supra note 31, at 22.

175. Id. at 27.
176. Id.
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Can human use co-exist with environmental -restoration? Who
pays the costs?
For the policy statement to work it must be linked closely to an
77
implementation scheme, so that it gets used in decision-making. 1
These observations, while made in an ocean management context, are
equally true of management of the state's coastal waters. As discussed
above, the policy statements incorporated in Maine's existing laws and
regulations are insufficient to meet this important threshold readiness
requirement because they are ambiguous and fail to provide any basis for
tradeoffs or prioritization among uses.'7 8 In 1992, Maine's Marine Policy
Committee also identified this as a major shortcoming.17 9 It recommended
that the state government, with input by environmental and economic
interests, develop "a clearly articulated comprehensive policy for the state's
marine waters" to "establish goals, objectives, and priorities to guide
marine research, resource management, and environmental regulation in the
marine environment."' 8 As a starting point, it suggested eight general
criteria that could form the underpinnings of such a comprehensive policy:
the promotion of the sustainable use of the marine environment; the
equitable distribution among the people of the state.of the socio-economic
benefits derived from the marine environment; the accommodation of
multiple uses while minimizing conflicts among competing users; the grant
of priority to the management and protection of living resources over
non-living, non-renewable resources; the protection of the ecological
integrity of state's marine waters for use by future generations; the establishment of a process for resolution of conflict between existing policy
mandates; the promotion of research in the Gulf of Maine through Maine's
Marine Research Board and other research organizations; and the preservation of Maine's maritime heritage.'
These well-conceived criteria constitute a necessary and important first
step in moving toward an eventual comprehensive policy for the state's
marine environment. They acknowledge the existence of use conflicts and
the need to identify priorities. They also start to make the transition from
perceiving use conflicts as a physical space allocation issue to viewing
177. Id. at 27 (citations omitted).
178. See supra Part III.B.
179. CATENA ET AL., supranote 31.
180. Id at 67.
181.. Id.

48

OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 4:1

them in the broader context of resource allocation decisions. They stress
stewardship over single-sector management.
However, limitations should be noted. Maine has taken no formal
action to accept these criteria; they remain the recommendations of a report
prepared for a subcommittee of the executive branch Land and Water
Resources Council. They assign priority to management and protection of
living resources over non-living, non-renewable resources, but do not make
recommendations on how to assign priorities and minimize conflicts
beyond these broad categories. They do not identify the need to address
problems posed by concurrent federal, state and local jurisdiction. They
leave to a later time the hard questions of how to operationalize key
concepts such as equitable distribution, ecological integrity and accommodation of multiple uses. The experience of other coastal states, discussed
below, may provide some guidance on how to make and implement these
difficult choices.
IV. ANALYSIS OF SELECTED CONFLICT RESOLUTION:
MECHANISMS FROM OTHER STATES

The preceding sections illustrate the overarching difficulties in
management of coastal waters: the complex jurisdictional split among
levels of government; the traditional narrow sector-by-sector approach to
management of marine resources and uses; and the absence of either clear
policies or a decision-making framework to establish marine resource use
and allocation priorities." 2 Decisions about valuable public resources are
frequently made using less than optimal methods: by default, deferring to
the first entity to assert a right to use a particular marine resource; by
litigation, with courts ruling only on very narrow fact-specific issues before
them; or by ad hoc legislative actions, readjusting the allocation among user
groups in response to lobbying efforts spearheaded by those groups with
the greatest financial stake in a particular resource.
These decisions frequently give the public interest little express
consideration, assuming it has been or will be factored in through the give
and take of the legislative process. Given the historical reticence of states
to assert their full fiduciary authority as trustee of coastal waters, this is
often a faulty assumption. As a result, the public interest, which should be
the primary consideration, is given short shrift.

182. See also Robert W. Knecht et al., National Ocean Policy: A Window of
Opportunity, 19 OCEAN DEV. & INT'LL. 113, 134-35 (1988).
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To begin to make hard decisions about the most appropriate allocation
of public resources, state governments must develop the capacity to assess
the impacts of actions taken in one sector on another sector. These
cross-cutting space, use, and resource allocation decisions should be made
within the context of a state-wide comprehensive, long-range plan for the
marine environment. This plan should articulate guiding principles which
grow from a public consensus on overall priorities and goals for this public
resource. For example, these principles might include a preference for
nonexclusive uses and reversible commitments of space and resources, a
preference for water-dependent uses, protection of habitat and bio-diversity, and a precautionary approach which places the burden upon those who
seek to exploit a resource to prove that there will be no unreasonable
interference with other coastal waters uses and resources."8 3 But the state
will have to go beyond general principles to develop implementation
systems.
Several states have already begun the process of formulating more
detailed plans and priority systems to manage their coastal waters. Some
advances have been process oriented, such as clarifying jurisdiction,
encouraging collaborative or integrated approaches to managing conflicts,
or developing protocols and frameworks as a methodology for systematic
conflict resolution. Other initiatives have employed specific management
mechanisms to make substantive changes. The following section highlights
some of the more promising mechanisms, divided into three primary types
of approaches: (A) the clarification of authority between state and local
governments; (B) the promotion of collaborative decision-making and
implementation; and (C) the use of space and resource allocation systems.
A. Clarificationof Authority Between State
And Local Governments
One finding of the Maine case study is that limits on local authority to
manage harbors and other waters within municipal boundaries are not clear.
Maine municipalities have tended to focus on traditional mooring and
vessel safety issues which are clearly within their jurisdiction. However,
as use conflicts escalate, they may seek to expand their management efforts
into less well-defined areas such as management of non-vessel or non-

183. See Jack H. Archer & M. Casey Jarman, Sovereign Rights andResponsibilities:
Applying Public Trust Principlesto the Management of EEZ Space and Resources, 17
OCEAN AND COASTAL MGMT.

253, 265 (1992).
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harbor conflicts. There is no authorizing legislation which defines the
range of local control for the State of Maine, nor are there mechanisms to
ensure that local decisions promote the state-wide public trust interest.
Maine's communities often pattern their harbor management plans
after a Connecticut model," 4 but they have done so in reliance on general
home rule powers, without benefit of Connecticut's enabling legislation." 5
Connecticut's laws clearly delineate the relationship of the harbor management commission to other local boards and state agencies, incorporate
mechanisms to foster local, state and federal coordination, and address
enforcement authority. 8 6 For example, as a mechanism to transfer the state
authority to the municipality, the state commissioners of environmental
protection and transportation must approve the proposed harbor management plan before it may be adopted by the municipality.'87 The local plan
will not be approved unless it is in compliance with state-wide resource
goals established in Connecticut's Coastal Management Act. 8 In addition,
to identify any federal concerns, prior to adoption the proposed plan must
be submitted to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for comment.' 9 Upon
adoption of the approved plan, the harbor management commission may
request a general permit from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and a
delegation of enforcement authority from the Connecticut Department of
Environmental Protection. 9
Connecticut's harbor management scheme requires municipalities to
engage in detailed planning for a water area and for land-side uses that will
impact the water. 9 ' The plan should address water uses such as moorings
and anchorages, channels, boat basins, limits on areas for persons living
aboard, no discharge zones, swimming areas, wildlife preserves, shellfish
beds, and recreational and commercial fishing areas192
Like Connecticut, the State of North Carolina has also granted political
subdivisions express authority over coastal waters. In 1983, North Carolina

184. See CONN. DEP'T OF ENVTL. PROTECTION, MODEL MUNICIPAL HARBOR
MANAGEMENTPLAN (1985) (reprinted in full by Maine Coastal Program, for distribution in

Maine).
185. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-1 13k to 113t (West 1995).
186. For more specific coordinating and jurisdictional provisions, see id. §
22a-113k(a), 113k(c), 113m, 113n, 113o, 113p.
187. Id. § 22a-113m.
188. Id. §§ 22a-90 to 113c.
189. Id. § 22a-I13m.
190. Id. § 22a-I13q.
191. CON. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-13n, 113o.
192. CONN. DEP'T OF ENVTL. PROTECTION, supra note 184, at 10.

1999] Dueling with Boat Oars, Dragging Through Mooring Lines 51
amended its general zoning enabling act to give coastal counties the power
to regulate development in coastal waters within theirjurisdictional boundaries and outside city limits, stating "[a] county may regulate the development over estuarine waters and over lands covered by navigable waters
owned by the State... within the bounds of that county."193 Unlike
Connecticut, North Carolina does not require state approval of the plan
before the delegated jurisdiction over state-owned lands becomes
effective.' 94
New York has taken a slightly different approach to delegating
authority over water uses to its political subdivisions. In 1992, to responsibly manage the state's proprietary interests in state-owned underwater
lands, New York amended its waterfront revitalization program to expand
and standardize the authority of local governments to regulate the use of
surface waters and underwater lands.195 The legislation grants local
governments the authority to adopt a "comprehensive harbor management
plan" and implementing ordinances as part of a local waterfront revitalization plan.' 96 The harbor management plan and implementing ordinances do not take effect until they are submitted to and approved by New
York's Secretary of State.197 Upon state approval, the municipality gains
two additional benefits: all state agency actions must be consistent with the
approved local waterfront revitalization plan to the maximum extent
practicable, 98 and if so provided in the plan, the municipality acquires the
authority to regulate everything "abounding" the municipality to a distance

193. N.C, GEN. STAT. § 153A-340 (Michie 1996). Due to increased use conflicts and
uncertainty about local jurisdiction, North Carolina's legislature has also granted all
municipalities in coastal counties the power to regulate swimming, surfing and littering
within its boundaries and within the "extraterritorial jurisdiction," and granted some listed
municipalities the right to regulate personal watercraft. Id. § 160A-176.1, 176.2.
"Extraterritorial jurisdiction" allows a municipality to opt to increase the area subject to
municipal zoning and land use regulation by up to three miles, depending on population size.
It has been used by some municipalities to extend jurisdiction into the Atlantic Ocean.
WALTER F. CLARK & STEVEN E. WHITESELL, NORTH CAROLINA'S OCEAN STEWARDSHIP
AREA: A MANAGEMENT STUDY 5 (1994).
194. WALTER F. CLARK, NORTH CAROLINA'S ESTUARIES: A PILOT STUDY FOR

MANAGINGMULTIPLEUSEINTHESTATE'SPUBLICTRUSTWATERS 19 (Albermarle-Pamlico
Study Report 90-10, 1990).
195. 1992 N.Y. Laws 791 (effective Aug. 7, 1992).
196. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 911 (McKinney 1996).
197. Id. § 922.
198. Id. § 915(8).
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of 1,500 feet from its shore, even if that exceeds the town's historic legal
boundaries. 9 9
The local waterfront revitalization plan must address problems of
conflict, congestion and competition for space in the use of harbors, surface
waters and underwater lands.2" It must consider regional needs; competing
needs of shipping, boating, fishing and shellfishing, aquaculture, waste
management, mineral extraction, dredging, public access, and recreation;
habitat, resource protection, water quality, open space, aesthetic values,
riparian or littoral rights and the public interest in submerged lands.2 'O The
implementing ordinances may regulate: wharves, docks, moorings, piers
and other structures, temporary or permanent, in, on or above waters; the
use of surface waters; and the use of underwater lands.
The mechanism for clarifying the local authority to manage nearshore
or harbor waters and integrating that authority with state fiduciary responsibilities for coastal waters will have to be tailored to the state's coastal
management framework. But these examples include some important
innovations. For example, Connecticut and New York include a state
review and approval process to ensure that local plans and ordinances are
consistent with state-wide and regional goals and priorities for public trust
lands. Connecticut also requires a United States Army Corps of Engineers
review, so that any obvious federal conflicts can be identified early in the
process. New York gives municipalities incentives to develop harbor plans
by requiring that state actions be consistent with an approved local plan.
Finally, New York simplifies the issue of geographic reach of municipal
boundaries and provides equal local authority by giving approved towns the
right to regulate a set distance off-shore regardless of whether that exceeds
historic town boundaries. These mechanisms clarify the authority of the
local government to more aggressively manage these conflicts, while at the
same time imposing overriding state guidelines to protect public trust
interests.

199. Id. § 922(1).

200. Id. § 915.
201. Id.
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B. Promotion of Collaborationin Decision-Making
and Implementation

An integrated, comprehensive, ecosystem-based approach is emerging
as the ideal model for management of coastal waters.2 However, one
commentator has identified significant tension between the model of
integrated management and the ideal of pluralism, observing that manage-

ment segmentation has been valued as a means to foster full participation
and interplay of interest groups in public debate. 3 He asserts this governance structure may itself present a serious impediment to integrated
management.2 °4
Similarly, another coastal expert cautions that the "alluring concept of
a 'comprehensive policy"' may not always be attainable, not only for
political reasons but because certain segments of marine policy evaluation
may be "better served by accepting single-sector solutions ... than by
dashing headlong on a perhaps quixotic course toward attaining comprehensive, wholly integrated policy."2 5 Rather than focusing on integration
through centralization, it may be more productive to pursue coordinated,
integrative solutions which enhance the ability to address conflicts among

202. Ames Borden Colt, The ChallengesofIntegratedEstuarineManagement in the
United States, 22 COASTAL MGMT. 369, 372 (1994).

203. Id.
204. Id.at 378. In asserting that this governance structure may present a serious
impediment to integrated management, the author observes:
The segmentation of most U.S. natural resource management agencies and
programs according to traditional or economically important uses derives in
large part from the United State's [sic] system of federalist democracy ....
To provide adequate representation of competing social interests in public
policy making, American pluralism has encouraged the diffusion of jurisdictional and statutory authority among multiple, relatively independent government entities, each devoted to the furthering of a major social interest or value
However, achieving consensus becomes increasingly difficult as each agency
or management program becomes entrenched in the advocacy of a particular set
of values or a narrow range of possible solutions. In estuarine management,
where integrated approaches are often critical to realizing management goals,
interest group conflict and management segmentation emerge as serious
impediments.
Id.
205. Harry N. Scheiber, Since the Stratton Commission Report: Policy Studies in
Ocean Governance,1969 and 1992, in OCEAN GOVERNANCE: ANEw VISION 19,20 (Biliana
Cicin-Sain ed. 1992) [hereinafter OCEAN GOVERNANCE].
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sectors and make trade offs among those activities.2" Thus, even if a
wholly integrated coastal policy is not the immediate goal, a state's
capacity to manage its coastal waters should be enhanced by improving the
process for multiple single-sector agencies to coordinate with one another
on cross-cutting decisions.
1.

State Interagency Coordination

Prospects for successful integrated management are increased if actions
taken by multiple state agencies are consistent with each other and if they
further overriding management principles. The State of Maine relies on its
Land and Water Resources Council, a body composed of the commissioners of eight departments and the director of the State Planning Office, to
provide this coordination.2 °7 The Council is charged with advising the
governor, legislature and state agencies on management policies, including
specific land and water resources management issues of state-level significance.20 8 However, since 1994, most of its efforts have been focused on
responding to a legislative mandate that it assess consolidating multiple
land-based resource protection laws.2°
In contrast, Oregon has more aggressively focused on improving
intergovernmental coordination as part of its ocean resources management
plan. 2'0 As one component, it has created an Ocean Policy Advisory
Council. 1 Unlike Maine's council, which is charged with oversight of
land and water, this body is focused on ocean and territorial sea management issues. Oregon's council is also more broadly representative; in
addition to state agencies, it includes a county commissioner, elected city
official, and ocean users representative of commercial fisheries, recreational fisheries, port navigation or transportation, non-fishing recreation,
environmental organizations, Oregon Indian tribes, small ports, and the
general public, all appointed by the Governor for four year terms. 21 2 The
council operates with the assistance of a permanent scientific and technical

206. Kern Lowry, Caveats on 'Integration' in Ocean and CoastalManagement, in
supra note 205, at 32.
207. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 3331(1) (West Supp. 1996).
208. Id. § 3331(2).
209. Id. § 3331(3).
210. See infra Part IV.C.5.
211. OR. REV. STAT. § 196.438 (1995).
212. Id.
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advisory committee. 211 It was charged with preparing a territorial sea
management plan and coordinating interagency actions such as by providing a forum for discussions, mediating disagreements, and coordinating
interagency review of specific projects through project review panels
(PRPs).2 14 The council is also responsible for encouraging federal agencies
to participate in resolution of ocean resources issues affecting the state.2 1
Oregon's project review panel mechanism is designed to facilitate
more effective and efficient dispute resolution in review of specific ocean
resource development proposals.216 A PRP does not have new or independent authority, but it will coordinate the review and make recommendations
on permit approval or denial, permit conditions, performance standards,
lease stipulations, and mitigation measures. 217 While a participating agency
is not legally bound by the recommendations of the PRP, it is intended that
its actions will be consistent with those recommendations; any agency that
does not accept the recommendation must provide the Ocean Policy
Advisory Council with written findings and conclusions to support its
* 218
position.
Maine and Oregon probably represent two ends of the spectrum of

possible intra-state coordinating mechanisms. Several other states have
implemented or recommended similar coordinating mechanisms. For
example, North Carolina's ocean management inventory recommended the
creation of an interagency management committee to coordinate sectoral
policies, clarify jurisdictional conflict, recommend legislative and rules
changes, and initiate interagency memoranda of agreement.1 9 California's
Resources Agency recommended the creation of a cabinet-level ocean

213. Id. § 196.451.

214. Id. § 196.443.
215. Id. § 196.443(f).
216. OR. OCEAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT TASK FORCE, supra note 38, at 168. A
Project Review Panel is to be used when there is no other effective mechanism for interagency projectreview and coordination, or when the expertise or authority of several agencies
is required to review a large, complex project or several related projects. Id. California has
also used a similar technique in connection with proposed offshore energy projects, to
oversee preparation of an environmental impact assessment document which would satisfy
federal, state and local environmental regulations. James Lima & Michael McGinnis,
California Ocean Use Management: An Assessment of Two IntegratingApproaches, in
INT'LPERSP. ON COASTALOCEAN SPACEUTILIZATION, PROC. FROMTHESECOND INT'LSYMP.
ON COASTAL OCEAN SPACE UTILIZATION 705, 708-711 (1993).

217. OR. REv. STAT § 196-453 (1995).
218. OR. OCEAN REsOURCES MANAGEMENT TASK FORCE, supra note 38, at 169.
219. CLARK & WHITESELL, supra note 193, at 54.
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resources management coordinating council.22 ° This council would
coordinate state agencies and programs, and eventually improve coordina"'
tion with other levels of government and other public and private groups.22
All of these methods attempt to coordinate at least the state's own agencies
and utilize existing agencies, perhaps on the theory that it is less problematic than creating a new state agency in charge of the marine environment.
It is likely that the success of these interagency coordinating efforts to
develop a holistic marine policy will be directly proportional to the level of
political commitment and to the institutional resources invested.
2.

Federal/StateCoordination

Coastal experts suggest that in the near term, it is unlikely that the
federal government will reorganize itself into an overarching agency to
promote integrated coastal and ocean management, thus it falls to the states
to initiate comprehensive coastal and ocean management. 22 2 Where
concurrent state and federal jurisdiction is involved, it is in the states'
interest to work in tandem with federal agencies.
When state and federal goals are compatible, the same types of
coordinating mechanisms used within a state can be extended to include
federal agencies.2 23 In fact, cooperative ventures spanning federal/state
jurisdictional barriers occur with great frequency. For example, resource
agencies such as National Marine Fisheries Service and U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service, the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency and the Army Corps of Engineers routinely collaborate with state
and local agencies on issues such as habitat protection, marine debris,
dredging, and regulation of anchoring to further mutual goals.224
On the other hand, if the state and federal goals are in conflict, the state
will have to use other techniques to gain federal agency acceptance of state

220. THE RESOURCES AGENCY OF CAL., supra note 49, at 6-1.

221. Id.
222. See Mark B. Adams & Scott T. McCreary, InstitutionalArrangementsfor State
CoastalManagement Programs:Some Strengths and Weaknesses, in 3 COASTAL ZONE '89:
PROC. OF 6T SYMP. ON COASTAL AND OCEAN MGMT. 2558,

2569 (Orville T. Magoon et al.
eds., 1989).
223. See supra Part IV.B.1.
224. For example, in the Monteray Bay National Marine Sanctuary, a court upheld
NOAA regulations limiting use of personal watercraft to supplement uneven local
regulations. Personal Watercraft Indus. Ass'n v. Department of Commerce, 48 F.3d 540
(D.C. Cir. 1995).
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goals for state coastal waters. The most promising technique for states is
to use the federal consistency provisions of the Coastal Zone Management
Act.22
While the precise scope is still subject to controversy,226 these federal
consistency provisions generally give each state with an approved coastal
management program authority to review certain "federal activities"' 2 that
affect the coastal zone to ensure that they are consistent with the enforceable policies of the state's coastal management program, to the maximum
extent practicable.228 Consistency reviews apply to federal activities
conducted within the coastal zoneP 9 or conducted outside the zone but
which affect land or water use or natural resources of the state's coastal
zone." Under certain conditions, a state may also be able to review the
activities of a second state that impact the first state's coastal zone.23'
However, it is not enough for the state to have a general plan or goals for
the coastal zone. Consistency compliance is not required unless those plans
or goals are implemented by the state through enforceable policy provisions. 2 Much of the ocean management planning of the "activist states,"

225. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1)(A) (1994).
226. See MarkT. Imperial & Jessica Cogan, The Evolution of the FederalConsistency
Provisions: The Controversy Continues, in COASTAL ZONE '93: PROc. OF 8TH SyMIP. ON
COASTAL AND OCEAN MGMT. 3048 (1993).
227. Activities subject to review include: direct federal activities, federally licensed
or permitted activities, outer continental shelf activities on area leased under the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act, or actions of state and local governments which are the subject
of applications for federal assistance. 15 C.F.R. §§ 930.35, .53, .54, .70, .90 (1995).
228. The consistency provisions vary slightly depending upon whether the proposal
involves a direct federal activity or development project, a federally licensed or permitted
activity, or federal assistance to state or local governments. To proceed, direct federal
actions and federal development projects located in the coastal zone must be "consistent to
the maximum extent practicable with enforceable state policies" while federally licensed and
permitted activities and federal assistance to state and local governments must "compl[y]
with" or be "consistent with" the "enforceable policies" of the approved state program. 16
U.S.C.A. § 1456(c)(1)-(3) (West 1986 & Supp. 1997).
229. This varies by state, but includes the area from the inland boundary of the
state-designated coastal zone to the outer limit of the U.S. territorial sea.
230. 15 C.F.R. § 930.33(c)(1) (1995).
231. City of Virginia Beach v. Brown, 858 F. Supp. 585 (E.D. Va. 1994) (attempt by
North Carolina to conduct federal consistency review ofproposed activity wholly in Virginia
but arguably affecting North Carolina's coastal zone dismissed on grounds of mootness
without reaching substantive question).
232. Enforceable policies are defined as "[s]tate policies which are legally binding
through constitutional provisions, laws, regulations, land use plans, ordinances, or judicial
or administrative decision, by which a [s]tate exerts control over private and public land and
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catalyzed by the threat of development in federal waters, is designed to take
maximum advantage of federal consistency leverage.233
3.

Creationof New Entities

A third approach to promote collaborative decision-making in coastal
waters is through the creation of new institutional entities to cut across
traditional political boundaries. This is frequently necessary because of a
mismatch between the boundaries of political subdivisions and the boundaries of environmentally-defined regions such as ecosystems, watersheds
or landscapes.234
During the last decade, various federal and state agencies have created
new entities to transcend traditional political boundaries and formalize
management of ecosystem-based areas. 2" They have utilized a variety of
techniques including common legislation
adopted by adjacent entities, 6
regional councils or task forces,237 interstate compacts,238 and voluntary

water uses and natural resources in the coastal zone." 16 U.S.C. § 1453(6a) (1994). If a
federal activity is not addressed by an enforceable policy, it is presumed to be consistent and
a consistency review is not necessary. Enforceable policies have to be approved by NOAA
as part of the state's coastal program.
233. CICIN-SAIN ET AL., supra note 31, at 16.
234. For a more complete discussion of the mismatch between boundaries of the
decisions and of the impact, see, for example, FRANCES IRWIN &BARBARA RODES, MAKING
DECISIONS ONCUMULATIVE ENvIRONMENTALIMPACTS: ACONCEPTUALFRAMEWORK 17-23
(1992).
235. See OFFICE OF WATER, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, THE WATERSHED
PROTECTION APPROACH (1991); COASTAL AMERICA, TOWARD A WATERSHED APPROACH:
A FRAMEWORK FOR AQUATIC ECOSYSTEM RESTORATION, PROTECTION, AND MANAGEMENT

(1994).
236. GULFOFME. WORKING GROUP, COUNCILON THE MARINE ENV'T, FORMALIZING
THE GULF OF MAINE INITIATIVE: INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR IMPLEMENTING THE

GULF OF MAINE INITIATIVE 3 (1991).
237. See e.g., COUNCIL ON THE MARINE ENV'T, supra note 167. (this Council was
created to develop a regional marine environmental quality monitoring plan when the
governors of Maine, Massachusetts and New Hampshire and the premiers of New Brunswick
and Nova Scotia signed the "Agreement on Conservation of the Marine Environment of the
Gulf of Maine Between the Governments of the Bordering States and Provinces"); British
Columbia/States Oil Spill Task Force, created by "Oil Spill Memorandum of Co-operation
Between the Province of British Columbia, the State of Washington, the State of Oregon,
the State of Alaska, and the State of California," (June 1989); St. Croix International
Waterway Commission, created by "Memorandum of Understanding Between the State of
Maine of the United States and the Province of New Brunswick of Canada Regarding the
St. Croix International Waterway," (Nov. 17, 1986).
238. See, e.g., Northwest Electric Power and Conservation Planning Council (created
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cooperation among multiple local, state and federal agencies such as
through the National Estuary Program. 9 These institutional adjustments
can enhance the ability to manage territorial sea resources by redefining
what might otherwise be inappropriate boundaries for scientific study,
monitoring and management.
4. Alternative Dispute Resolution
A final institutional adjustment to promote coordinated decisionmaking is through the use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) techniques designed to avoid formal adjudicatory processes. Informal ADR
techniques, such as public information gathering hearings and informal
meetings between staff and applicants, are utilized continuously, usually
without labeling them as such. But natural resource allocation disputes are
also making growing use of more formal ADR techniques to find common

ground among conflicting user groups.' °
For example, North Carolina has focused on a variety of ADR efforts

to resolve disputes between commercial and recreational fishermen.24
These efforts have included: structured meetings facilitated by the National
Park Service between recreational anglers and commercial fishermen for
243
a lake-sized tidal pool;242 professional mediation of fisheries disputes;

by interstate compact between Idaho, Montana, Washington and Oregon, and with
Bonneville Power Administration Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and
Conservation Act), 16 U.S.C. § 839 (1994). See also HARRY BADER, POTENTIAL UTIL1TY
OF AN INTERSTATE COMPACr AS A VEHICLE FOR OIL SPILL PREVENTION AND RESPONSE,

SPILL-THE WRECK OF THE ExxoN VALDEz app. M (Univ. of Alaska Sea Grant Legal
Research Team 1989).
239. 33 U.S.C. § 1330 (1994).
240. See Josm QUINTRELL & GRO FLATEBO, Alternative Dispute Resolution, in
OPTIONS FOR MANAGING MAINE'S NEAR SHORE ECOSYSTEMS, supra note 166, at 1-2;
Richard G. Hildreth, The Public Trust Doctrineand Conflict Resolution in CoastalWaters:
West Coast Developments, in 3 COASTAL ZONE '89: PROC. OF 6T SYMP. ON COASTAL &
OCEAN MGMT., supra note 222 at 2604. (discussing techniques for managing conflicts
including prioritizing marine uses; multiple-use planning; activity schedules, corridors and
buffer zones reached through negotiations; and coordinated federal and state review).
241. Panel Discussion of Use Allocation at HatterasPoint/Pond:A Case Study, in
FINDING COMMON GROUND, PROC. FROMTHETHIRD N. C. MARINERECREATIONALFISHING
FORUM 21 (1994).
242. Id
243. See Andy Sachs, ProfessionalMediation, in id. at 37.
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and the use of educational forums to attempt to identify common interests
and mitigate user conflicts. 2"
ADR is particularly promising where multiple agencies or user groups,
with overlapping jurisdiction and interests, are interested in the same
project or limited resource. 245 As individuals gain more experience with the
different techniques and as the justice system, in general, embraces ADR,
its role in the marine context will grow.
C. Space and Resource Allocation Systems
In addition to the institutional adjustments and cooperative mechanisms discussed immediately above, states are also employing more
substantive planning initiatives and regulatory systems to resolve conflicts.
Since each state has the flexibility to weigh its own social values and
develop its own hierarchy among permissible public trust uses, there is
considerable variation from state to state, not246only in techniques employed,
but also in value assigned to different uses.
Some substantive mechanisms include: physical space allocation
systems performance standards, and a combination of space allocation
systems and more comprehensive management and planning. Among the
more promising allocation techniques are submerged lands leasing programs, marine zoning, special area management plans, performance
standards and ocean management plans.
1. Submerged Lands Leasing Programs
Submerged lands leasing programs can help minimize use conflicts in
coastal waters by requiring users who propose permanent occupancy of
state coastal waters to first obtain a lease or other conveyance from the
state. These programs typically control only built infrastructure or physical
changes in, on, or over submerged lands, such as permanent structures or
dredging, and are not designed to control temporary or transient uses such
as seasonal docks, recreational use, or capture fisheries.
Many states have one or more submerged lands leasing statutes. Some
are single-purpose statutes, applicable only to one use such as aquacul-

244. Introduction, in id. at 1.
245. QUINTRELL & FLATEBO, supra note 240, at 12.
246. ARCHER ET AL., supra note 29, at 101.
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ture;247 others are generic and control a broad range of uses. 248 Typically,
the submerged lands lease program is not the only governmental oversight
of the proposed development. A development program will usually need
other local, state or federal regulatory permits as well.249
The submerged lands leasing statutes utilize a variety of provisions to
minimize potential conflicts with other public trust uses. Programs usually
limit the term of the lease, and the size and character of the lease area.
Some statutes explicitly reserve the most productive areas for general
public use."S Leasing programs generally have specific review criteria to
determine whether the proposed use will have unacceptable adverse
impacts on public trust uses of the remaining lands."' For example, lease
247. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 253.68 (West 1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 6072
(West 1981 & Supp. 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 20-10-1 (Michie 1989).
248. See DEL.. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 7201-7216 (Michie 1991 & Supp. 1996); ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 558-A (West 1994 & Supp. 1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 274.005(7),
(8) (1995); TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 33.001-.176 (West 1978 & Supp. 1996-1997);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 79.90.455 (West 1991 & Supp. 1997).
249. For example, in Washington State, a proposed use of aquatic land will require
both an Aquatic Lands Lease from the Department of Natural Resources and a county or city
Shoreline Substantial Development local permit. WASH.REv. CODEANN. §§ 79.90.010- 90,
902, 90.58.010-.58.930 (West 1991 & Supp. 1997). Similarly, in Hawaii, an applicant will
need a use approval from the conservation district and a lease. HAW. REv. STAT. §§ 190D-1
to -36 (1993). Specific uses will frequently need to comply with additional state programs
regulating water quality and other aspects of the use.

250. For example, naturally productive shellfish areas are often not available for lease
by private entities; the intent of the leasing program is not to lessen the availability of the
resource to the general public but rather to supplement the resource by allowing exclusive
use of areas which could become productive with private stewardship. Timothy Eichenberg
& Barbara Vestal, Improving the Legal Frameworkfor Marine Aquaculture: The Role of
Water Quality Laws andthe Public Trust Doctrine,2 TERRITORIAL SEA J. 339, 368 (1992).

Washington State specifies that the state may decline to lease lands with significant natural
values. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 79.90A60(3) (West 1991 & Supp. 1997-1998). Florida
directs that leases shall not displace viable commercial or recreational harvesting areas open
to the general public. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 18-21.004 (1997).
251. For a discussion of Maine's criteria, which use specific standards to operationalize concepts of when a proposed use will be contrary to the public interest, see supra Part
III.B.2. In contrast, Florida specifies that to be in the public interest, a proposed private
use must have:
Demonstrable environmental, social, and economic benefits which would accrue
to the public at large as a result of a proposed action, and which would clearly

exceed all demonstrable environmental, social, and economic costs of the
proposed action. In determining the public interest in a request for use, sale,
lease, or transfer of interest in sovereignty lands or severance of materials from
sovereignty lands, the board shall consider the ultimate project and purpose to

be served....
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programs may be directed to approve uses only if they provide certain types
of pubic benefits,252 if the public benefits will "clearly exceed all demonstrable environmental, social, and economic costs," 3 or only if the
proposed use will be compatible with lawful public uses including navigation, fishing, and recreation and will not impinge upon the rights of riparian
owners.2 4 Ifa lease is granted which permits private occupancy of public
lands, most states require that the leased area remain available for other
public trust uses such as recreation, capture fishing, and navigation to the
extent they
are not inconsistent with the purpose for which the lease was
255
granted.
These submerged lands lease programs vary considerably in their
allocation mechanisms. Some programs allow upland owners or local
governments to veto proposed leases even though they would be consistent
with the state-wide interest in the use of public trust lands. 6 A few lease
programs employ competitive bid mechanisms to select the lessee once it
has been determined that a particular space will be leased to some private
entity for a particular purpose.257

FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 18-21.003(38) (1990).

252. Washington encourages a balance of public benefits including direct public use
and access, fostering of water dependent uses, environmental protection, and utilization of
renewable resources. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 79.90.455 (1991); WASH. ADMIN. CODE
§ 173-16-060(2) (1997). If there are leasing conflicts between water dependent uses, priority
is to be given "to uses which enhance renewable resources, water-borne commerce, and the
navigational and biological capacity of the waters, and to state-wide interests as distinguished from local interests." WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 79.90.460(1) (West 1991 & Supp.
1997-1998).
253. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 18-21.003(40) (1997).
254. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-202(a) (Michie 1997).
255. For example, Florida's aquaculture leasing provisions provide that except when
necessary to permit the effective development ofthe species being cultivated, the public shall
have reasonable access to the leased area for traditional water activities such as swimming,
boating and fishing. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 253.72 (West 1991). The burden is on the lessee
to clearly post all limitations on public use authorized by the lease. Id. Hawaii also authorizes specific provisions in the lease to minimize the impact on pubic trust uses, including
requiring lanes for navigation through the leased site if feasible and posting notice of any
limitation of use. HAW. REV. STAT. § 190D- 11 (West 1993).
256. Eichenberg & Vestal, supra note 250, at 371.
257. In Washington, while most lease fees are set in accordance with the assessed
value of the adjacent upland, aquaculture lease fees are established through competitive
bidding or negotiation. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 79.90.490, .90.490 (West 1991 & Supp.
1997-1998). Hawaii has the option to use an auction process to allocate space for
aquaculture facilities once approval has been granted for an aquaculture use in that location.
HAW. REV. STAT. § 190D-22 (1993). Similarly, Oregon can use a competitive bidding
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However, despite the variation, all of the programs have the potential
to reduce multiple use conflicts in coastal waters by: (1) reminding users
that the lands are public and subject to state management, (2) creating a
revenue stream to enhance the management of public lands, and (3)
allowing the state to control permanent uses of coastal waters by approving,
approving with conditions, or disapproving a proposed use.
The effectiveness of the program as a conflict resolution mechanism
will depend upon how comprehensively the state has developed its decision-making framework. If the state has not engaged in much coastal
waters management planning, decisions may be ad hoc and based purely on
space allocation criteria. In states with more advanced planning and
management for their coastal waters, these leasing decisions should also
reflect state policies on use priorities and desired resource allocation.
2.

MarineZoning

In most states, there are already a plethora of spatial designations for
coastal waters. A partial list might include military activity zones, navigational fairways and shipping lanes, dredge spoil disposal sites, marine
sanctuaries, areas closed to certain types of fishing, water quality discharge
areas, oil transfer areas, underwater cable areas and anchorage areas."5
These types of designations are, however, disjointed and generally address
only a single activity. While not yet used extensively by many states or
communities, there is growing interest in extending controls similar to
traditional, comprehensive land-based'zoning into the water."
As a threshold matter, efforts to zone the water must overcome certain
complications such as: the three dimensional nature of the sea bed, water
column, and water surface; the enforcement difficulty of ascertaining the

system if the riparian owner declines to exercise its preemptive right to lease the submerged
land abutting its parcel at a specified ni.'nimum rent. OR. REv. STAT. § 274.040 (1995).
258. For example, a survey of North Carolina law found ihe following existing spatial
designations: areas closed to specific fishery activities; areas closed to certain types of
fishing techniques; military restricted areas; specific resource sanctuaries; and 750- foot
buffer areas around ocean fishing piers. CLARK & WHrrESELL, supra note 193, at 47-48.
259. For example, the Environmental Protection Agency recently included watersheet
zoning (described as a technique to set aside areas of a waterbody for separate uses such as
navigation channels, mooring areas, and waterskiing) as a new coastal protection technique,
noting that it has been used in a few communities but not yet extensively tested. OFFICE OF
WETLANDS, OCEANS AND WATERSHEDS, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, COASTAL
PROTECTION PROGRAM: WORKSHOPS IN INNOVATIVE MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES FOR

ESTUARIES, WETLANDS, AND NEAR COASTAL WATERS 6-3 (1996).
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precise geographic location of a point in the water on the face of the earth;
the difficulties of communicating physical boundaries with nautical charts
or physical markers; and the "mobility of the fluid medium." However, the
relative difficulties of zoning land and water may have been exaggerated"6
and, at any rate, are certainly diminishing with advances in global positioning systems and sea bed mapping.
Marine zoning, involving essentially the same processes and regulatory
approach as its terrestrial counterpart, can be used comprehensively to
divide the entire coastal water area within its jurisdiction into various use
and intensity categories.26' Ideally, a water zoning scheme would be
compatible with the natural features and important ecosystem functions of
the waterbody, be coordinated with the zoning of the adjacent uplands, and
recognize existing development and uses while stressing environmental
conservation.2 62
Rhode Island, one the first states to use marine zoning as a component
of its comprehensive land and water management system, established a
state coastal permitting system in 1971. It requires a Coastal Resources
Management Council (CRMC) assent for all new development activities in
tidal waters, on the shoreline, or landward to within 200 feet of specified
coastal features, and for specific, potentially high-impact development in
any location. 263 The program is built on water use categories which apply
to all coastal waters of the state.2' Each water use category permits only
certain uses, and the permissible upland activity is dictated by the adjoining
water use category.
The overarching goal of Rhode Island's system is "preservation and
restoration of ecological systems., 265 That goal is implemented, to the
extent feasible, by leaving undisturbed coastal areas in that condition, by

260. J.R. Schubel, Clean-up, Conservationand Enhancement of the Coastal Ocean:
A Confusion of Priorities,in INT'L PERSP. ON COASTAL OCEAN SPACE UTILIZATION: PROC.
FROM THE 2ND INT'L SYMP. ON COASTAL OCEAN SPACE UTILIZATION 645, 651 (Phyllis M.
Grifman & James A. Fawett eds., 1993). But see also RICHARD A. KENCHINGTON,
MANAGING MARINE ENVIRONMENTS 38 (1990).
261. J.R. SCHUBEL, ZONING: A RATIONAL APPROACH TO ESTUARINE REHABILITATION

AND MANAGEMENT 4 (Marine Sciences Research Ctr., State Univ. of N.Y. No. 75-4, 1975).

262. Id.
263. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 46-23-6 (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1997).
264. R.I. CODER. 04 000 020 (1994). The categories are: Type 1: conservation areas;
Type 2: low-intensity use; Type 3: high-intensity boating; Type 4: multipurpose waters; Type
5: commercial and recreational harbors; and Type 6: industrial waterfronts and commercial
navigation channels. Id.
265. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 46-23-1(a) (1996).
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consolidating new facilities with like facilities, and by concentrating

high-intensity development in areas where the shoreland had already been
disturbed.'
Within each water use category, there are statements of
priority to guide the CRMC.267
Washington State's Shoreline Management Act,26 also adopted in

1971, utilizes similar water classification techniques but allocates more
responsibility to local government.269 The Act requires local governments

to prepare and administer Shoreline Master Programs (SMP) and, pursuant
to such programs, to issue shoreline development permits.

°

The SMP

must be consistent with the priorities and guidelines of the Shoreline
Management Act, and local SMPs and shoreline development permits are
reviewed by the Washington State Department of Ecology.27
The SMP applies to "all marine waters of the state, together with the
lands underlying them" from the shoreline outward to the city or county

limit in the water and to upland areas extending inland a distance of 200
feet from the ordinary high water mark; it also applies to streams, rivers,

266. The water classification system is supplemented by specific standards for
activities under council jurisdiction, including recreational boating facilities, houseboats and
floating businesses, aquaculture, and municipal harbor regulations. The latter must be found
to be consistent with the Coastal Resources Management Program. STATEOFR.I., COASTAL
RESOURCES MANAGEMENT PROGRAM, as amended, 1990.
267. R.I.CODER. 04000010(1994). For example, for commercial and recreational
harbors, it states:
[t]he highest priority uses of Type 5 waters and adjoining land areas within
Council jurisdiction are (a) berthing, mooring, and servicing of recreational
craft, commercial fishing vessels, and ferries; (b) water-dependent and waterenhanced commerce, including businesses catering to tourists; (c) maintenance
of navigational channels and berths, and removal of obstructions to navigation;
and (d) activities that maintain or enhance water quality and scenic qualities,
including the preservation of historic features. The Council shall suitably
modify or prohibit activities that significantly detract from or interfere with
these priority uses.
d The management program utilizes special area management plans to further detail
policies in Providence Harbor and coastal salt ponds.
268. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 90.58.010-.030 (West 1992 & Supp. 1997-1998).
269. Il § 90.58.050.
270. Id. § 90.58.070, .58.140.
271. The SMP takes precedence over other local land use planning and zoning "since
the Shoreline Management Act represents state-wide concerns and is based on the public
trust doctrine protecting the rights of the people of the State of Washington." Washington
State Department of Ecology, Shoreline Master Program Handbook, in SHORELINE
MANAGEMENT GUIDEBOOK 93 (1990).
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certain lakes and reservoirs. 2 All subtidal lands and certain intertidal
lands are designated as "shorelines of state-wide significance." In these
areas local governments must give particular preference to uses which
protect state-wide interests over local interests. 3
The primary tool for implementing the Shoreline Master Program is the
classification of shorelines into specific "environmental designations."274
Similar to zoning, each designation is mapped and accompanied by a
purpose statement, management policies, and matrices designating permitted uses, activities and intensity of development.2 75 However, it is not the
precise equivalent of local land use zoning.276
Coastal submerged lands can be designated as one or more "aquatic
environments" rather than classifying them as an extension of the upland
environment. A community may divide its submerged lands into several
different aquatic designations, such as aquatic harbor, aquatic navigation,
and aquatic conservation.27 7
The state suggests sample aquatic environment management policies
including: prohibiting structures which are not water-dependent, prohibiting uses which will substantially degrade the existing character of the area,
requiring developments to be compatible with the adjoining upland,
encouraging public access, minimizing interference with surface navigation, and minimizing adverse visual impacts. 8 In addition, sample policies
also address conflicts among water-dependent uses.27 9 Local governments

272. Id. at 3.
273. Id. at 56-58.
274. Typically these environmental designations might include natural, conservancy,
rural, suburban, urban-maritime, urban, and aquatic, but local governments may add other
categories. The first six would be upland designations. Id. at 106.
275. Id. at 93-94, 107.
276. The Department of Ecology recommends that the SMP be compatible with the
local zoning code but be independent of it, and focus on water-dependency characteristics
rather than on specific uses. Id. at 107.
277. Washington State Department of Ecology, supra note 271, at 128.
278. Id. at 128-129.
279. Id. For example, suggested sample policies include the following:
aquaculture practices should be encouraged in those tidelands, waters and beds
most suitable for such use; several industries using the same tideland facilities
shall be given preference over single industry use; in appropriate areas, fishing
and recreational uses of the water should be protected against competing uses
that would interfere with those activities; all developments and activities using
navigable waters of their beds should be located and designed to... allow for
the safe, unhindered passage of fish and animals, particularly those whose life
cycles are dependent on such migration.
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are encouraged to modify these sample policies to reflect local conditions
and opportunities." 0
State guidelines also include sample best practices standards for
specific shoreline use categories including aquaculture, boating facilities,
mining, and floating homes. As in Rhode Island, the shoreland management system and classification of waters is designed to affect the issuance
of permits for substantial development, thus, it only indirectly affects
activities that do not require new facilities or alterations such as dredging

or fill.
A variation developed in North Carolina recommends employing
"marine zoning" as one tool to allow local governments to implement local
plans consistent with more holistic state-wide guidelines.28 ' Water use
zoning maps would not be regulatory per se, but rather would illustrate

where particular policies should be considered.2 2 As illustrated in a North
Carolina study for the Albemarle-Pamlico Estuary, a model water use
classification system could divide coastal waters into discrete geographic

areas. Additional specific ordinances, such as a marina siting ordinance,
could refer to the water use classifications to identify those areas where
marinas should be preferred, carefully scrutinized or discouraged.28 3
These water management systems in Rhode Island, Washington and
North Carolina illustrate how terrestrial zoning methods can be adapted to
comprehensively divide coastal waters into use and intensity classifications.' Marine zoning can be used as one of several tools to implement

Ud

280. Id. at 128.
281. North Carolina's recommendations are based on an earlier model water use plan
developed as part of the Albemarle-Panilico Estuarine Study. CLARK, supranote 194. This
model water use plan was developed for the public trust waters of Carteret County as one
management option, to illustrate policies that might be developed through a water use
planning process. Id. at 4. After developing a series of policy statements on resource
protection, resource production, and other public trust uses, it employed a GIS system to
develop and apply a simple water use classification system which divided public trust waters
into three categories: preservation, conservation and developed. Id. at 4. These classifications are not envisioned as regulatory per se, but would control what type of use would be
encouraged or discouraged. Id. These preferences would be implemented through special
area management plans, such as local harbor management plans, which would make more
detailed spatial divisions. k1 at 3-4.
282. Walter F. Clark, ManagingMultiple Use in U.S. CoastalPublic Trust Waters,
in INT'L PERSP. ON COASTAL OCEAN SPACE UTILIZATION, supra note 260, at 655, 659.
283. Id. at 662.
284. Other countries also experimenting with marine zoning include Australia and
Norway. Richard G. Hildreth, LearningfromOtherNations,in OCEAN GOVERNANCE,supra
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a more comprehensive coastal water management plan. However, as with
traditional land-based zoning, this tool regulates major new developments
and major changes in use rather than transient uses. It should help minimize future use conflicts by geographically separating particular types of
uses and directing them to the areas most capable of absorbing likely
environmental impacts, but is not designed to facilitate resolution of
conflicts among temporary or transient uses.
3.

Special ManagementAreas

A third technique, special area management plans (SAMPs), generally
allow for more detailed regulation than submerged lands leasing programs
or marine zoning. Rather than being applicable only to proposed major
development or substantial changes in use, they can also be used to regulate
temporary or transient uses. However, due to the intensive effort and cost
of developing such plans, SAMPs are likely to be developed only for the
most intensely used or most environmentally sensitive areas.
An example of a particularly comprehensive management plan is the
Florida Keys National Marine Sanctuary Management Plan.285 Applicable
to an area of approximately 2,800 square nautical miles, it includes coastal
and ocean waters, submerged lands and islands landward to the mean high
water mark. The management plan, completed in 1996, was developed by
NOAA in partnership with the State of Florida, and with the participation
of other federal agencies, local governments, non-governmental groups,
resource users and the general public. 86 The purpose is to "ensure the
sustainable use of the Key's marine environment by achieving a balance
between comprehensive resource protection and multiple, compatible uses
of those resources. 287

note 205, at 28; see also Jens C. Sorensen & Scott T. McCreary, COASTS: INSTITUTIONAL
ARRANGEMENTS FORMANAGING COASTALRESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTS 19 (1990); Hans
Olav Ibrekk et al., NationwideAssessment of the Suitability of the Norwegian CoastalZone
andRiversfor Aquaculture (LENKA), 21 COASTAL MANAGEMENT 53 (1993).
285. NAT'L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., FLORIDA KEYS NATIONAL MARINE
SANCTUARY FINAL MANAGEMENT PLAN / ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (1996).

286. Key West residents voiced their opposition to the sanctuary in November of
1996, rejecting a nonbinding referendum in support of the Florida Keys National Marine
Sanctuary. However, on January 28, 1997, Florida's governor and cabinet approved the
management plan for the state-owned portion of the sanctuary. State approval was critical
because two-thirds of this area is within state waters. Nancy Klingener, Futureof Sanctuary
May Be Decided Today, MIA HERALD, Jan. 29, 1997, at lB.
287. Id. at Abstract.
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The Management Plan consists of ten action plans, composed of
integrated management strategies, to be implemented through a gradual
process.288 The strategies address boating, fishing, land use, recreation,
water quality, zoning and education.28 9 To supplement existing management areas such as national wildlife refuges and state parks, the Plan
establishes four new marine zoning categories. These zones impose
specific regulations, in addition to those applicable to the Sanctuary as a
whole, on a very small percentage of the area. Unlike more traditional
marine zoning discussed above, the emphasis of the Florida Keys zones is
on controlling temporary user activities, rather than regulating proposed
development.
Spaces in one zoning classification, Wildlife Management Areas, are
already designated by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. 290 They protect
endangered or threatened species and their habitats by restricting access
and minimizing disturbance. Within the zone, areas are further designated
for no wake/idle speed only, no motor use, closed, and no access buffer
zones.29' Ecological Reserves, a second classification, designates large,
contiguous diverse habitats; to protect spawning, nursery and residence
areas and allow species populations to replenish, consumptive activities are
limited but compatible recreational activities are allowed. 2 2 The third
zoning classification, Sanctuary Preservation Areas, proposed for shallow,
heavily-used reefs, would minimize user conflicts and avoid further
resource degradation in these areas by prohibiting fishing, collecting and
all other consumptive uses.293 Eventually, but of lower priority, limited
duration Special-Use Areas may set aside space for research or conserva288. The ten action plans are: (1) Channel/ReefMarking; (2) Education and Outreach;
(3) Enforcement; (4) Mooring Buoy; (5) Regulatory; (6) Research and Monitoring; (7)
Submerged Cultural Resources; (8) Volunteer; (9) Water Quality; and (10) Zoning. Id.
289. Id. at app. H.
290. Id at 30.
291. Id. These areas would include bird nesting, resting, or feeding areas and turtle
nesting beaches. Regulations could have a seasonal component, such as nesting season
closures. Id. at app. H-15.
292. NATLOCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERICADmiN., supranote 285, at 31. In the Draft
Management Plan, this zone type was referred to as Replenishment Reserves but NOAA
changed the name to Ecological Reserves in the Final Management Plan to reflect public
concerns over the purpose of the areas. These areas were proposed based on the assumption
that they will protect biological diversity and increase the productivity of important marine
species. They will be used as a control area to understand the impacts of human use, and
will be reevaluated after five years to expand, modify or eliminate these zones. Id. at app.
H-16.
293. Id. at app. H-16.
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tion purposes, or confine high-impact activities such as powerboat racing,
mooring fields, live-aboard areas or personal watercraft to limited areas. 2'
The Plan also relies on continued management of already designated parks,
refuges and aquatic preserves. 95
Some non-zoning strategies are also designated to address user
conflicts. For example, the Florida Keys management plan includes: a
channel marking program to limit boating activity in shallow-areas; a
mooring buoy strategy to require use of moorings rather than anchors and
to control mooring placement in particularly sensitive areas; a special-use
permit system for concession-type commercial activity; and marina and
live-aboard strategies to reduce pollution and concentrate activities where
facilities are available.296 In contrast to more traditional marine zoning, this
special area management plan is designed to control specific temporary
activities and transient uses as well as permanent development in public
waters. It employs many coordinated strategies, only some of which rely
on zoning classification systems.
4. Performance Standards
Performance standards are a fourth type of management tool. Instead
of zoning submerged lands or employing other direct geographic controls
on activity location, they establish decisional criteria to guide state agencies
or local governments in reviewing specific applications.
For example, Hawaii developed state planning and evaluation guidelines for private marina development in 1991. State agencies, recognizing
that public funds would be unable to satisfy the need for additional
recreational boating facilities, realized that private marina development
would have to satisfy the growing demand. However, the state wanted to
regulate private marina development in public waters to assure protection
of the public's interest, minimize adverse impacts, maximize pubic
benefits, and allocate valuable ocean space in a fair and equitable
manner.2 97 The resulting performance standards include a set of siting
criteria that: minimize dredging and blasting; prevent any contamination of

294. Id. Activities in these areas may be conducted by permit only. Id. at 34.
295. Referred to as Existing Management Areas, the function of these zones is to
recognize established management areas and to, at a minimum, complement existing
management programs. Id. at H-16.
296. Id. at 43.
297. OFFICEOFSTATEPLANNING, STATE PLANNING AND EVALUATION GJIDELINES FOR
PRIVATE MARINA DEVELOPMENT 6-7 (1991).
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surface water or ground water; avoid environmentally sensitive areas such
as wetlands, wildlife refuges, marine life conservation districts, and
sanctuaries; assure adequate physical separation from other recreation
water use298areas; and avoid encroachment on scenic and open space
resource.
Similarly, through its Connecticut Coastal Management Act (CCMA),
Connecticut established extensive goals and policies for the management
of coastal lands and resources. 29 Local actions must be in accordance with
the policies, standards and evaluation procedures established by the
CCMA.3" The statutory policies of the CCMA override any less restrictive
state or local regulatory standards.3"' For local land use development
proposals, the CCMA is enforced through a simultaneous Coastal Site Plan
Review to determine if the proposed use is consistent with the state policies. 3" Local governments may also adopt municipal coastal programs
which are consistent with the statewide goals and policies. 0 3
Connecticut's policies are extensive and detailed, and provide some
useful guidance to resolve use conflicts. For example, among the numerous
policies, one requires a proposed use to be consistent with the capability of
the land and water resources to support that use without significantly
disrupting either the natural environment or sound economic growth.3°
Another gives high priority and preference to uses which are dependent
upon proximity to the water or shorelands , 5 A third directs that in
shorelands adjacent to marine and tidal waters, use conflicts are to be
resolved by giving preference to uses that "minimize adverse impacts on
natural coastal resources while providing long term and stable economic
benefits." 3' Specific provisions also give highest priority and preference
in urban and commercial fishing ports to water dependent uses, "including
but not limited to commercial and recreational fishing and boating uses.
Other policies suggest some limits on how to accommodate the increased

Id. at 11.
CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-90 to -109 (1995).
Id. § 22a-101.
Id. § 22a-100.
Id. § 22a-109.
Id. § 22a-101.
Id. § 22a-92(a)(1).
305. CoNN. GEN STAT. § 22a-92(a)(3) (1995).
306. Id. § 22a-92 (a)(4).
307. Id. § 22a-92(b)(1)(C).

298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
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demand for recreational boating °8 and address topics such as sewer and
water lines, ports, oil and chemical spills, tank farms, tidal wetlands,
habitat, urban infrastructure, estuarine resources, the shellfish industry, and
recreational and commercial fisheries. 3" These very detailed performance
standards allow the state to establish policies for local implementation
without the state itself engaging in zoning or other specific space allocation
decisions.
5.

Ocean Management Plans

In the last several years, resource managers have begun to develop
more comprehensive resource allocation management plans for marine and
coastal waters. These plans may enlist traditional physical space allocation
mechanisms as part of the implementation strategy, but also utilize these
tools within the context of a more holistic, integrated, ecosystem perspective. They focus not only on competing demands for the same space, but
also on competing or incompatible demands for the same resource. 0
These resource allocation plans require a public interest balancing of many
factors including recreational uses, commodity uses, wildlife habitat, and
preservation/environmental issues.
During the last decade, frequently with the assistance of federal coastal
zone management or Sea Grant funds, several states have developed ocean
policy reports or ocean management plans.3 ' These reports usually
inventory state and federal laws affecting marine waters from some upland
boundary out to the 200 mile exclusive economic zone limit,' 12 identify
308. Id. § 22a-92(b)(1)(I).
309. See id. § 22a-92.
310. For example, California uses an ecosystem management approach in its ocean
plan which stresses environmental protection rather than use conflict resolution. It analyzes
ocean impacts by looking at four interdependent zones: the inland watershed from the
mountains to the shoreline; enclosed waters zone including bays, estuaries, and subtidal
areas; nearshore ocean zone including open coastal waters out to a depth of 100 meters; and
offshore ocean zone including a depth of 100 meters to 200 miles offshore. THE RESOURCES
AGENCY OF CAL., supra note 49, at 4-1. Oregon's ocean resources management plan
contains two types of recommendations, one set for improving the tools for governing, and
the other set for conservation and habitat protection of specific ocean resources. OR. OCEAN
RESOURCES MANAGEMENT TASK FORCE, supra note 38, at 54.
311. See THE RESOURCES AGENCY OF CAL., supra note 49. CHRISTIE, supra note 31;
HAW. OCEAN AND MARINE RESOURCES COUNCIL, HAWAII OCEAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT

PLAN (1991); MCLAUGHLIN &HOWORTH,supra note 31; CLARK& WH1TESELL, supranote
193; OR. OCEAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT TASK FORCE, supra note 38.
312. The jurisdiction of ocean management studies is typically open seas including
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gaps and inconsistencies, and make recommendations for more integrated
management of that area.313 The goal is typically to get beyond the
traditional sector-by-sector approach and facilitate rational multiple-use
ocean management pursuant to a new comprehensive ocean resources
management plan. 1 4 The issues
vary, depending upon the conflicts and
315
opportunities facing the state.
In theory, multiple-use ocean management should advance use conflict
resolution throughout the stewardship area by establishing priorities for
valued uses and establishing a framework within which to make decisions
about space and resource allocation. However, in actuality, the geographic
scope and activity emphases of most first generation ocean plans are not
intended to address competition for space and resources on a scale relevant
to resolving nearshore use conflicts.1 6
In most states, the primary motivation for developing an ocean plan is
to arm the state to defend itself against outside development interests in

both the state (0-3 miles) and federal (3-12 miles) territorial waters and the exclusive
economic zone (0-200 miles), but generally does not include enclosed or semi-enclosed
water bodies such as bays, estuaries, shorelines. However, states can define different
boundaries. Oregon defines its "stewardship zone" as including less than the entire
exclusive economic zone; it includes the entire continental margin from mean high water
across the continental shelf and down to the bottom of the continental slope. OR. RESOURCES MANAGEMENT TASK FORCE, supra note 38, at 13. California defines its ocean
ecosystem more broadly to include the inland watershed zone (from the watersheds of the
Sierra Nevada to the shoreline) and enclosed waters (bays, estuaries and subtidal areas) as
well as nearshore ocean (open coastal waters out to a depth of 100 meters) and offshore
ocean zone (a depth of 100 meters to 200 miles offshore). RESOURCES AGENCY OF CAL.,
supra note 49, at 4-1.
313. RESOuRCES AGENCY OF CAL., supra note 49, at 1-4 to 1-5.
314. Id.
315. For example, in California, the specific issues analyzed included habitats and
living resources, water quality, shoreline erosion, ports and harbors, oil and gas, vessel
traffic safety, tourism and recreation, research and education, information technology,
mineral resource extraction, and desalination. RESOURCES AGENCY OF CAL., supra note 49,
at 2-1. Similarly, Oregon was concerned about not only traditional conflicts in the use of
renewable resources, but was also concerned about the introduction of new non-renewable
uses such as marine minerals extraction and oil and gas exploration. OR. OCEAN RESOURCES
MANAGEMENT TASK FORCE, supra note 38. North Carolina focused on minerals, oil and
gas, fisheries, pollutants, ocean dumping, recreational uses, and marine protected areas.
Other states have focused on additional issues such as marine transportation, recreational
fisheries, aquaculture, ocean waste disposal, and military activity. CICIN-SAIN, supranote
31, at 14.
316. But see infra text accompanying notes 318-334 for a discussion of Oregon's
Territorial Sea Plan, a second generation component of the original Ocean Resources
Management Plan.
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federal waters through the federal consistency review process.3 17 As a
result, ocean plans typically focus on the exclusive economic zone and
federal activities in federal waters beyond the three-mile territorial sea
which could affect states and localities. Thus, these ocean plans emphasize
shared state-federal decision-making, equitable division of costs and
benefits of development of resources, and documentation of shoreland
impacts and risks of offshore activities. 318
However, even though most ocean management plans devote little
attention to conflict resolution among temporary uses in coastal waters, it
is important to recognize that ocean planning is still in its infancy and is
continuing to evolve. Oregon's ocean planning and management process,
one of the most advanced, illustrates the potential of this approach to
resolve use and resource conflicts. Oregon's 1991 Ocean Plan states its
broad state-wide goals are to:
protect the overall integrity, diversity, stability and complexity of
the marine ecosystem; and give priority to the conservation of
renewable resources; to renewable resource uses over nonrenewable resource uses; and to non-consumptive uses over consumptive
uses. 319
These general goals are elaborated upon in sector-specific recommendations.320 These recommendations are then tied to specific geographic
areas.3 2 In addition to identification of sensitive areas for marine birds and
mammals, the plan envisions the identification of other important areas,
such as fishery areas where nonrenewable resource uses will not be
allowed.322

317. CICIN-SAIN ETAL., supranote 31, at 16, 21.

318. While the most aggressive states have generally been on the West Coast, the need
for state participation in these decisions was also embraced by New England governors in
a 1987 proclamation on behalf of their citizens resolving that the New England states "might
be full partners in the management of Exclusive Economic Zone resources and share in an
equitable division of benefits derived from their development." Id. at 4 (quoting New
England Governor's Conference Proclamation issued Dec. 15, 1987).
319. OR. OCEAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENTTASKFORCE, supranote 38, at 54. Such
goals include the protection the overall integrity, diversity, stability and complexity of the
marine ecosystem and the conservation of renewable resources. Id.
320. Id. at 90-91.
321. Id. at 119-20.
322. Id.
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Oregon's ocean plan included some guidance for the territorial sea
portion of the ocean stewardship area. For example, it recommended that
the state "prohibit development activities in the territorial sea which would
impair the cultural, scenic, or recreational values ofthe near shore areas." 3"
It also recommended prohibition of oil and gas exploration and development within the state territorial sea.324 However, for coastal waters, the
most significant recommendation in the ocean plan was that the state
develop a separate management-oriented territorial sea plan which would
be a component of the ocean plan.3z
In 1994, Oregon adopted such a territorial sea plan.326 The plan,
though a work in progress, requires state agencies to amend their programs
and rules for ocean resources so as to be consistent with the territorial sea
plan.327 Federal agencies must also act in a manner consistent with the
enforceable policies of the territorial sea plan as it has been accepted by the
federal Office of Coastal and Ocean Resource Management as part of
Oregon's federally-approved Coastal Management Program.328
The 1994 territorial sea plan includes three major elements: (1) an
overview of the ocean management framework, with an emphasis on the
territorial sea, (2) a rocky shores management strategy, and (3) procedures
and standards "for making future decisions about ocean resource activities
'
unknown or unanticipated today."329
The resource use decision section of
the plan sets out criteria to guarantee that new uses in or affecting the
territorial sea will be allowed only after informed decision making. 33 It
builds in a precautionary principle by placing the burden on the
applicant. 33 ' If the information is insufficient or incomplete, the agency
may terminate the decision-making process until the information is available.332 Or at its option, the agency may authorize a pilot project, to take
place under restricted and controlled conditions, to gather the requisite

323. Id.

324. Id. at 139.
325. OR. OCEAN POLICY ADVISORY

COUNCIL, OREGON OCEAN MEMo No.

10

at 1

(1993). The territorial sea plan was developed by the Ocean Policy Advisory Council, a
group composed of state agency representatives, governmental subunit representatives,

appointed representatives of user groups, and appointed members of the general public.

326.

OR. OCEAN POLICY ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 51.
327. OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 196.435 (2) (1993).
328. OR. OCEAN POLICY ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 51, at 2.
329. ld. at ii.

330. Id. at 43-64.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 48.
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information.333 The procedure emphasizes that any government agency
making a decision about marine resources and uses must comply with the
Territorial Sea Plan, Oregon's ocean law, Statewide Planning Goal 19 on
Ocean Resources, the Ocean Resources Management Plan and any amendments, including any detailed guidance on resource conservation associated
with these plans, goals and laws.334
Emerging comprehensive ocean management plans have the potential
to bring a more holistic, ecosystem management approach to use conflict
resolution. The geographic scope and activity emphases of most first
generation ocean plans and studies are too broad to make a significant
contribution to resolving specific user conflicts. But with successive
generations of more detailed plans, they can increase the focus on the
states' territorial sea and develop specific management strategies for areas
experiencing the greatest user conflicts.
V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conflict resolution strategies for use in states' coastal waters are still
in the initial stages of development. More empirical evidence will be
required to determine if these particular approaches will successfully
protect the public interest and reduce user conflicts. It is clear, however,
that as conflicts escalate, states must more forcefully assert their role as
public trustee by developing a comprehensive plan for the states' coastal
waters. To be effective, they must establish resource use priorities and
develop guidance and systems to mediate conflicts among user groups. In
the absence of state leadership, resource and space allocation may be made
by self-help appropriation, citizen-initiated referenda, special interest
legislation, or other ad hoc methods which offer less than optimal protection for the broad public interest in this valuable resource.
The threshold requirement for effective management of states' coastal
waters is a comprehensive plan to inventory existing conditions and
conflicts, identify future opportunities, select among the alternative futures,
and articulate goals and objectives.
Oregon's ambitious ocean
management/territorial sea planning process provides a good model for
states like Maine that have recognized the problem but that are just
beginning to develop management plans. It advocates an ecosystem
approach to management based on detailed inventories, furthers the goal of

333. Id.

334.

OR. OCEAN POLICY ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 51, at 44.
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maintaining the health of the habitat and ecosystem, and contemplates
increasingly detailed special area management plans for specific environments of its coastal shorelines and waters.
The various state coastal waters management initiatives suggest coastal
conflict management plans will be strongest if they:
(1) are authorized by legislative action mandating the development 6f a plan for coastal waters;335
(2) thoroughly analyze existing laws and regulations to evaluate
the geographic scope and use priorities, both express and unwritten, to reconcile inconsistencies;3 36
(3) incorporate procedural mechanisms to coordinate multiple
local, state and federal
agencies, each with some limited authority
33 7
over the waters;
(4) clearly delineate the respective roles of different levels of
government in planning and implementation; 338 and
(5) establish mechanisms for the continued refinement of management strategies until they are capable of implementing concrete
measures to resolve use and resource conflicts.339
Several techniques appear capable of furthering conflict resolution in
coastal waters. These techniques include submerged lands leasing pro-

336. Most state ocean management plans contain a section inventorying and analyzing
federal and state laws affecting coastal and ocean waters. For example, Florida's ocean
study, prepared for the Governor's Office of Planning and Budgeting, works toward a state
ocean policy by first undertaking a very thorough analysis of the scope of authority and
degree of consistency of laws and policies of multiple state agencies which govern some
aspect of the territorial sea or beyond. CHRISTIE, supra note 31. Coastal scholars in Mississippi undertook a similar analysis through a Sea Grant-funded study. MCLAUGHLIN &
HOWORTH, supra note 31.
337. See supra notes 202-223 and accompanying text.
338. Some ocean plans have addressed the division of state and local authority. For
example, California's ocean plan recommends some state-wide positions such as a
prohibition on new oil and gas leasing in all state tidelands, recommends continued reliance
on local management to control conflicts such as separating surfing and swimming, and
suggests conflicts with "greater than local significance" such as use of personal watercraft,
recreational boating, shark chumming and species/tourism conflicts be addressed at regional,
state or federal levels. RESOURCES AGENCY OF CAL., supra note 49, at 5E-7, 5G-4 to -5. A
similar distinction was made in North Carolina after an ocean stewardship study concluded
that state's Coastal Area Management Act of 1974 was inadequate to manage coastal waters.
CLARK & WHITESELL, supra note 193, at 20.
339. See supra notes 309-318 and accompanying text.
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grams, comprehensive marine zoning, special management areas, and
state-wide performance standards. Ideally, these tools should be used to
implement a territorial sea component of a comprehensive ocean management plan which incorporates a socially-approved priority system for
resource allocation, space allocation, and allowable resource degradation.
The plan should include detailed guidelines on priorities and tradeoffs
among user groups as well as a decision-making process for evaluating
proposed uses not specifically addressed in the plan. If a state is not yet
ready to prepare a full ocean management plan, a more limited territorial
sea plan can nonetheless make a substantial contribution to conflict
resolution.
To effectively minimize conflicts, any system for management of
coastal waters must control temporary or transient uses as well as permanent uses and alterations. If particular uses lack state-wide or regional
significance, states may opt to defer to local governments to control the
details of nearshore temporary uses. To avoid inaction created by uncertainty, states should expressly delegate this responsibility to local governments and should grant them jurisdiction over a fixed distance offshore,
regardless of historic local boundaries. States should, however, maintain
oversight and establish general guidelines to ensure that local action is
consistent with the state's comprehensive plan for its coastal waters.
Making the political decision to provide the state leadership necessary
to adopt and implement a comprehensive management program for coastal
waters is an important first step. This decision is easily justified by the fact
that coastal waters are a public resource of the state and that the state has
a fiduciary responsibility to hold and manage these lands for the benefit of
the public. Not all uses can be accommodated though, and hard choices
must be made to minimize the costs of continued, unresolved conflict.
These choices are better made by the state; self-regulation by stakeholders
or privatization are inappropriate to resolve current disputes over use of this
common property resource.
The more difficult task will be to develop a consensus on the appropriate goals for coastal waters and to elaborate a hierarchy of uses and
decision-making criteria at a level of detail sufficient to guide concrete
management decisions. There are an array of techniques, both procedural
and substantive, available to states to get beyond the fragmentation
currently caused by multiple single-focus agencies, narrow purpose laws
and concurrent jurisdiction. The challenge rests with coastal states to
develop the scientific base needed for rational management, to establish
goals and priorities for space and resource use, to implement strategies to
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minimize use conflicts, and to advance those uses deemed to be most
beneficial to the public and of highest priority for coastal waters.
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